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THE EVOLUTION OF TITLE IX: 
PROSPECTS FOR EQUALITY 
IN INTERCOLLEGIATE 
ATHLETICS 
Christina Johnson* 
The American sportswoman has begun to achieve recogni-
tion for her participation in an arena historically reserved for 
the male athlete. Sport has long been a primary socializing agent 
that has emphasized the stereotypic masculine model of compe-
tition, power, and dominance. l This model is culturally per-
* Second Year Student, Golden Gate University School of Law 
1. See, e.g., Oglesby, The MasculinitylFeminity Game: Called on Account of 
.... ,in WOMEN AND SPORT: FROM MYTH TO REALITY 75,82 (C. Oglesby ed. 1978) [here-
inafter cited as WOMEN AND SPORT] (citing Felshin, Sport, Style, and Social Mode, J. 
PHYSICAL EDUCATION RECREATION 31, 46 (1975), which makes the argument that sport is 
a primary social mode for stereotypic sexuality. "While hunting, politics, religion, and 
commerce may playa role, sport and warfare are consistently the chief cement of men's 
house comradery." K. MILLETT, SEXUAL POLmcs 48 (Virago Paperback ed. 1969). 
"[C]ertain play-forms may be used consciously or unconsciously to cover up some social 
or political design." J. HmZINGA, HOMO LUDENS: A STUDY OF THE PLAY ELEMENT IN CUL-
TURE 205 (Beacon Paperback ed. 1955). Commentators emphasize sport as a "masculine 
rite of passage": 
In its social definition it is obvious that sport in the United 
States serves as a masculine rite of passage. It could not be a 
vehicle for socialization into manhood except that the ideal-
ized values invested in sport symbolically and socially have 
important masculine connotations. This may be so because 
men played more important roles in establishing both society 
and sport, or because men are simply more important in a so-
cial view; in any case, the assumption of sport as masculine is 
a basic aspect of it as a symbolic formulation of ideal values. 
F. GERBER, J. FELSHIN, P. BERLIN & W. WYRICK, THE AMERICAN WOMEN IN SPORT 182 
(1974). 
The stereotypic model is taught and reinforced very early. Stein & Smithells, Age 
and Sex Differences in Children's Sex Role Standards About Achievement, 1969 DEV. 
PSYCH. 252, cited in Duquin, The Androgynous Advantage, in WOMEN AND SPORT, supra, 
at 93. 
The perceived relation between sport and the quality of life in 
American society is central to an understanding of the 
predominantly male-oriented tenor of both the sports creed 
and of sports activities in America. Sports are seen as primary 
vehicles for enculturating the youth who will 'be the future 
custodians of the republic,' in the words of the late General 
759 
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ceived as appropriate for men but basically inconsistent with the 
female role.2 During the past ten years, women have emerged to 
shatter this stereotype by demonstrating their athJetic abilities 
in all levels of comp"etition. Their achievement, most notably in 
the area of intercollegiate athletics, has resulted in controversy 
regarding the proper governing structure for women's athletics.3 
MacArthur. In America, roles involving the establishment and 
maintenance of security, leadership, control, and other instru-
mental functions are typically reserved for males. Therefore, 
given the claimed relation between sport and the greater soci-
ety, it is to be expected that the focus will be upon males, with 
females being more or less ignored and excluded from the 
claimed benefits of sports. 
H. EDWARDS, SOCIOLOGY OF SPORT 100 (1973). 
2. See Horner, Toward an Understanding of Achievement-Related Conflicts in Wo-
men, in WOMEN AND ACHIEVEMENT, SOCIAL AND MOTIVATIONAL ANALYSIS 207, 207-08 (M. 
Mednick, S. Tangri & L. Hoffman eds. 1975) [hereinafter cited as WOMEN AND ACHIEVE-
MENT]. Horner finds that traditional notions of femininity continue to affect young men 
and women: 
[d. 
The prevalent image of women found throughout history, 
amidst both scholarly and popular circles, has with few excep-
tions converged on the idea that femininity and individual 
achievements which reflect intellectual competence or leader-
ship potential are desirable but mutually exclusive goals. The 
aggressive, and by implication, masculine qualities inherent in 
a capacity for mastering intellectual problems, attacking diffi-
culties, and making final decisions are considered fundamen-
tally antagonistic to or incompatible with femininity. Since 
the time of Freud's treatise on the "Psychology of Women," 
the essence of femininity has been equated with the absence 
or "the repression of [their] aggressiveness, which is imposed 
upon women by their constitutions and by society" [Freud, 
1933, p. 158]. 
. . . It is clear in our data • • • that the young men and 
women tested over the past seven years still tend to evaluate 
themselves and to behave in ways consistent with the domi-
nant stereotype that says competition, independence, compe-
tence, intellectual achievement, and leadership reflect posi-
tively on mental health and masculinity but are basically 
inconsistent or in conflict with femininity. 
3. The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) has been engaged in a 
struggle for control of women's intercollegiate athletics. On January 13, 1981, the NCAA 
voted to sponsor women's championships in Division I, which includes those colleges and 
universities having the m9st extensive and costly programs. As a result, approximately 
215 women will be placed on key committees like the NCAA Council, Executive Commit-
tee and Infraction Committee. In January, 1980, the NCAA voted to sponsor five wo-
men's championships for Divisions II and III beginning in the 1981-82 season. San Fran-
cisco Chronicle, Jan. 14, 1981, at 61, col. 1. Division II colleges and universities have 
programs that are intermediate in size and cost, and Division III colleges have much 
Women's Law Forum 
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Despite significant advances during the last decade, the sports-
woman continues to face social and legal challenges in the 
eighties. 
Enactment of Title IX. of the Education Amendments of 
1972' enhanced the opportunity for women to participate in in-
tercollegiate sports, yet complaints of sex discrimination con-
tinue to grow.G Although there has been a dramatic increase in 
smaller athletic programs overall. u.s. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, MORE HURDLES To 
CLEAR 21 (1980) [hereinafter cited as MORE HURDLES To CLEAR]. The attempt by the 
NCAA to take over the AIAW sparked considerable controversy regarding control of in-
tercollegiate athletics. The issue is whether intercollegiate sports programs should be 
governed by separate organizations as they have been up until recently, or by a unified 
governing organization. The Association for Intercollegiate Athletics for Women (AIAW), 
established in 1971, has been successfully sponsoring women's intercollegiate athletics 
and has continually emphasized the importance of academic as well as athletic achieve-
ment. Some members of the AIAW regard the NCAA action as counterproductive to the 
AIA W philosophy of sport, as well as to the continuing growth of women's athletics. See 
Wheeler, NCAA v. AIAW, WOMEN'S SPORTS, June 1980, at 20. The Women's Sports 
Foundation, in expressing their support for the AIAW, stated: 
Historically, women have not had a significant role in in-
tercollegiate athletic governance; intercollegiate athletics has 
been synonymous with men's athletics. Only in the last dec-
ade, with the creation of the AIAW as the women's intercolle-
giate athletic governing organization and the advent of Title 
IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, has our society be-
gun to broaden its definition of athletics to include women. 
Even now it remains common to refer to "athletics" and 
"women's athletics," as though the generic term were male 
and including women required a modifier. One of the prime 
effects of the NCAA's proposal to govern women'!, athletics 
may be to perpetuate the second-class citizenship of women in 
the athletic establishment. 
The record of the NCAA with respect to women speaks 
for itself. It has opposed, at every opportunity, the passage 
and implementation of federal legislation dealing with equal 
opportunity for women in college athletics. 
Women's Sports Foundation, Down to the Wire: AIAW and NCAA, WOMEN'S SPORTS, 
Jan. 1981, at 60. 
4. Pub. L. No. 92-318, § 901, 86 Stat. 373 (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 
(1976». Title IX provides that: "[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of 
sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to dis-
crimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assis-
tance . . •• " For a discussion of Title IX's application to intercollegiate athletics, see 
Cox, Intercollegiate Athletics and Title IX, 46 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 34 (1977); Kadziel-
ski, Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972: Change or Continuity?, 6 J.L. & 
EDuc. 183 (1977); Note, Sex Discrimination and Intercollegiate Athletics, 61 IOWA L. 
REv. 420 (1975); Note, Sex Discrimination and Intercollegiate Athletics: Putting Some 
Muscle on Title IX, 88 YALE L.J. 1254 (1979) [hereinafter cited as YALE Note]. 
5. As of June 15, 1980, the Department of Education had received more than 130 
.. 
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women's participation,6 confusion and criticism regarding the 
practical application of Title IX continue to stall efforts by 
many sportswomen to participate with the same degree of insti-
tutional support afforded to men,? Equal opportunity in inter-
collegiate athletics can be strengthened by clarifying the man-
dates of Title IX, affirmative action by intercollegiate athletic 
programs, and successful litigation on behalf of those athletes 
who are denied their rights under both Title IX and the equal 
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United 
States Constitution, 
This Comment will analyze the development of Title IX, as 
it affects female athletes, from its inception in 1972 to the publi-
cation by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare 
(HEW)8 of the final policy interpretation in December of 1979,9 
In particular, the final policy will be carefully scrutinized to de-
termine whether it is consistent with and, more specifically, how 
well it serves the important public policy goals which informed 
the statute,lO Although the analysis will reveal weaknesses in 
complaints against 80 colleges and universities alleging sex discrimination in athletics. 
Title IX Enforcement Begins Soon, 17 NCAA NEWS, June 15, 1980, at 1. 
6. According to 1980 statistics compiled by the Women's Sports Foundation, 50% of 
all college athletes are female, an increase of 250% in 10 years. Although the number of 
sports offered women students has increased markedly since 1973-74 (from an average of 
2.5 to 5 sports per institution), the number of sports available to men in 1978-79 was an 
average of 48 percent higher. MORE llURDLES To CLEAR, supra note 3, at 24. 
7. Colleges and universities continue to spend a disproportionately larger amount on 
men's athletics. During 1978-79, the average per capita expenditures for male athletes at 
institutions belonging to both the NCAA (Division I), and the AIAW was $5,257, more 
than double the $2,156 allocated for each female athlete. These universities spend an 
average of 14.3% of their total athletic budgets on women's athletics even though women 
constitute 28.9% of the athletes. MORE HURDLES To CLEAR, supra note 3, at 29. In 1977-
78 one major university was reported to have budgeted approximately $5 million for 
men's athletics but only $180,000 for women's athletics. Roach, Is Title IX Scoring 
Many Points In Field of Women's Sports?, N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1977, at 51, col. 1. 
8. The Department of Health, Education and Welfare became two separate depart-
ments (Department of Education and Department of Health and Human Services) on 
May 4,1980. Pub. L. No. 96-88, §§ 301, 506, 93 Stat. 677, 692 (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 
3441, 3503 (Supp. III 1979». Because this Comment analyzes regulations and policies 
issued by HEW, this name will be used throughout the discussion unless reference is 
made to developments specifically occuring after May 4, 1980. Soon after inauguration, 
President Reagan stated that he "plans to abolish" the Department of Education. Wall 
St. J., Jan. 30, 1981, at 1, col. 3. 
9. 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413 (1979). The poliey interpretation reflects HEW's interpreta-
tion of the intercollegiate athletic provisions of Title IX and its implementing 
regulations. 
10. See note 14 infra and accompanying text, for discussion of legislative history. 
Women's Law Forum 
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HEW's policy, specific remedies are suggested which will aid in 
ensuring equal opportunity for intercollegiate sportswomen. 
I. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
Title IX provides in pertinent part that "[n]o person in the 
United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from partic-
ipation in, be denied benefits of, or be subjected to discrimina-
tion under any education program or activity receiving Federal 
financial assistance .... "11 This language, specifically modeled 
after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964/2 was designed to 
expand the earlier statute's prohibition against discrimination 
on the basis of race, color, or national origin in any federally 
assisted program. IS Legislative history makes clear that Title IX 
was prompted by a pervasive pattern of sex discrimination in all 
levels of education. I. Title IX's specific effect on and application 
11. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976). "Approximately 20,000 school districts and higher edu-
cation institutions receive financial assistance from programs administered by HEW and 
now by ED [the Department of Education]. The Office for Civil Rights (OCR) is respon-
sible for monitoring their enforcement with Title IX .••• " U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL 
RIGHTS, ENFORCING TrrLE IX, at 7 (1980) [hereinafter cited as ENFORCING TITLE IX]. 
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976). Title VI provides that "No person in the United 
States shall, on the ground of race, color or national origin, be excluded from participa-
tion in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or 
activity receiving Federal assistance." 
13. Originally Title IX was intended to amend Title VI by simply adding the word 
"sex." 117 CONGo REC. 9821-23 (1971) (remarks of Rep. Green) • "This is identical lan-
guage specifically taken from Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act • . • ." 117 CONGo 
REc. 30407 (1971) (remarks of Sen. Bayh). 
Discrimination against the beneficiaries of federally assisted 
programs and activities is already prohibited by Title VI of 
the 1964 Civil Rights Act, but unfortunately the prohibition 
does not apply to discrimination on the basis of sex. In order 
to close this loophole, my amendment sets forth a prohibition 
and enforcement provisions which generally parallel the provi-
sions of Title VI. 
118 CONGo REc. 5807 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Bayh). HEW concurs: 
• • • Except for certain specific exemptions not directly 
pertinent to athletics, paragraph 901(a) of Title IX is virtually 
identical to paragraph 601(a) of Title VI of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964. Since the language of Title IX so closely parallels 
that of Title VI, in the absence of specific Congressional Indi-
cations to the contrary, the Department has basically inter-
preted Title IX consistently with interpretations of Title VI in 
similar areas. 
40 Fed. Reg. 24,134 (1975). 
14. See generally Discrimination Against Women: Hearings on Section 805 of H.R. 
16,098 Before the Special Subcomm. on Education of the House Comm. on Education 
and Labor, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) [hereinafter cited as Sex Discrimination Hear-
5
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to intercollegiate athletics is less clear, because ~thletics are 
never specifically mentioned in the statute itself. Senator Birch 
Bayh, sponsor of the bill, referred to athletics only twice during 
congressional debates on the subject.15 One of these statements, 
which most clearly reflects Title IX's coverage of intercollegiate 
sports, also foreshadows the later controversy regarding inte-
grated teams: 
I do not read [Title IX] as requiring integra-
tion of dormitories between the sexes, nor do I 
feel it mandates the desegregation of football 
fields. What we are trying to do is provide equal 
access for women and men students to the educa-
tional process and the extracurricular activities in 
a school, where there is not a unique facet such as 
football involved. We are not requiring that inter-
collegiate football be desegregated nor that the 
men's locker room be desegregated.16 
That Title IX was intended to apply to intercollegiate ath-
letics became clear when several proposed bills and amend-
ments, seeking to exempt revenue-producing sports from the 
statute, were defeated. The first was introduced by Senator John 
Tower of Texas on May 20, 1974.1'1 His amendment provided, in 
incs]. Representative Edith Green of Oregon, who later sponsored Title IX on the floor 
of the House during the debates in 1971 and 1972, was chairperson of the hearings. Tes-
timony from the hearings indicates that educational institutions were the primary focus 
of complaints concerning sex discrimination. The hearings were relied upon in both 
houses during the subsequent debates on Title IX. 
In the summer of 1970, Representative Edith Green, chairman 
of the House Special Subcommittee on Education, held exten-
sive hearings on discrimination and related areas • • . Over 
1,200 pages of testimony document the massive, persistent 
patterns of discrimination against women in the academic 
world. Yet despite a situation which approaches national scan-
dal, the problem has gone unnoticed for years. 
118 CONGo REc. 5804-06 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Bayh). "Discrimination in education is 
one of the most damaging injustices women suffer. It denies them equal education and 
equal employment opportunity, contributing to a second class self image." CONGo REc. 
30406 (1971) (quoting THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON WOMEN'S RIGHTS 
AND REsPONSmILITIES (April 1970». 
15. 117 CONGo REc. 30407 (1971) (remarks of Sen. Bayh) (no requirements that in-
tercollegiate football be desegregated); 118 CONGo REc. 5807 (1972) (remarks of Sen. 
Bayh) (personal privacy in sports facilities must be maintained). 
16. 117 CONGo REC. 30407 (1971). 
17. S. 1539, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., § 536, 120 CONGo REc. 15,477 (1974) (as passed by 
Senate). See Sex Discrimination Regulations: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Post-
secondary Education of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 94th Cong., 1st 
Women's Law Forum 
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part, that Title IX "shall not apply to an intercollegiate athletic 
activity to the extent that such activity does or may provide 
gross receipts or donation to the institution necessary to support 
that activity."1S The Tower amendment was subsequently de-
leted by the conference committee on the Education Amend-
ments of 197419 and replaced by what has become known as the 
"Javits Amendment."20 This amendment provides in pertinent 
part as follows: 
Sess. 47 (1975); Prohibition of Sex Discrimination Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Labor and Public Welfare, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975): 
Mr. Chairman, it is interesting to me that in the midst of the 
highly vocal debate now going on whether or not Title IX 
should apply to either revenue producing sports in particular, 
or intercollegiate athletics in general, no one is making the ar-
gument that there is not discrimination against women. No 
football coach or athletic director is denying that there is 
something fundamentally wrong with a college or university 
that relegates its female athletes to second rate facilities, sec-
ond rate equipment, or second rate schedules, solely because 
they are women. No one seriously disputes the fact that ath-
letic budgets for women are a fraction of those provided for 
men. Instead, the argument has focused on the ability of cer-
tain intercollegiate sports to withstand the financial burdens 
imposed by the equal opportunity requirements of Title IX. 
To this end, those who feel such sports as football could not 
survive such financial strictures are seeking to exempt these 
sports from the mandates of Title IX, through the Tower bill, 
S.2106. 
As the Senate author of Title IX, Mr. Chairman, I am opposed 
to the Tower bill, not because I am oblivious to the economic 
concerns of those members of the NCAA opposing Title IX, 
but because I think their COncern is based upon a misunder-
standing of both what is required under the Title IX regula-
tions and the true implications of the Tower proposal. 
Id. at 46-47 (remarks of Sen. Bayh). 
It is clear that the amendments seeking to exclude revenue-producing sports from the 
scope of Title IX were prompted, in part, by the concern that funds derived from such 
sports as football and basketball would be diverted to the women's program. There is, 
however, no evidence to support this contention. 
Many men's athletic departments have expressed concern that 
funds to increase athletic opportunities for women would have 
to be taken from the men's program, adversely affecting other 
men's sports. The data presented in this and the previous 
chapters show, however, that men's budgets have increased 
substantially in the past five years and that men's programs 
continue to be considerably larger than women's programs. 
MORE HURDLES To CLEAR, supra note 3, at 30. 
18. S. 1539, 93d Congo 2d Sess., §v536, 120 CONGo REC. 15477 (1974). 
19. S. REP. No. 1026, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONGo & 
An. NEWS 4271. 
20. Pub. L. No. 93-380, § 844, 88 Stat. 612 "(1974). 
7
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The secretary of HEW shall prepare and pubJish 
. . . proposed regulations implementing the pro-
visions of Title IX of the Education Amendments 
of 1972 relating to the prohibition of sex discrimi-
nation in federally assisted education programs 
which shall include with respect to intercollegiate 
athletic activities reasonable provisions consider-
ing the nature of the particular SpOrts.21 
Following the Javits Amendment, other proposed amend-
ments attempted to exempt revenue-producing sports from Title 
IX;22 these amendments died in committee. Additionally, Sena-
tor Jesse Helms of North Carolina introduced two bills designed 
to remove intercollegiate athletics from consideration under the 
statute. Neither bill passed.23 In light of these unsuccessful con-
gressional efforts to restrict the scope of Title IX, it is clear Con-
gress perceived and intended the statute to cover intercollegiate 
athletic programs.24 Moreover, Congress failed to disapprove 
21. Id. 
22. Representative O'Hara introduced a bill which sought to allow revenue-produc-
ing sports to use their profits to maintain their own teams before diverting them to other 
men's and women's teams. The bill was referred to the House Subcommittee on Post-
secondary Education. The bill died in committee. See H. R. 8394, 94th Congo 1st Sess., 
121 CONGo REc. 21685 (1974). On July 15, 1975, Senators Tower, Bartlett, and Hruska co-
sponsored a bill which again sought to exempt revenue-producing sports from Title IX. 
According to Sen. Tower, "[t]he purpose of our amendment ... is to limit HEW's au-
thority [in such an event] to aspects of intercollegiate sports programs other than the 
revenues produced by and used for individual sports activities." See S. 2106, 94th Cong., 
1st Sess., 121 CONGo REc. 22778 (1975). Although the Senate Subcommittee on Education 
considered one amendment in hearings on September 16 and 18, 1975, it also died in 
committee. See 43 Fed. Reg. 18,774 (1978). 
23. S. 2146, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONGo REc. 23736 (1975), 43 Fed. Reg. 18,774 
(1978). On January 31, 1977, Senator Helms reintroduced previous S. 2146 as S. 535. The 
bill would have prohibited federal agencies from enforcing regulations pertaining to ath-
letics where participation in those athletic activities was not a required part of the cur-
riculum of an educational institution. See S. 535, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). 
24. See National Automatic Laundry & Cleaning Council V. Schultz, 443 F.2d. 689, 
706 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (positive action by Congress rejecting limiting amendments reflects 
a clear purpose to which the court may refer in determining legislative intent); Gaal & 
DiLorenzo, Legality and Requirements of HEW's Proposed Policy Interpretation of Ti-
tle IX and Intercollegiate Athletics, J. COLL. & U.L. 6 (1979) (unsuccessful attempts to 
exclude athletics from Title IX are evidence of congressional intent that athletics be 
covered); "If Title IX is inapplicable to intercollegiate sports, the Javits amendment 
would be a nullity. Even the Tower amendment presumes coverage for all but revenue-
producing sports." Cox, supra note 4, at 36 n.15. See also YALE Note, supra note 4, at 
1255 n.15 which states that: "[i]t can hardly be disputed that the statute includes athlet-
ics by its terms and the subsequent legislative history leaves no doubt that this interpre-
tation was intended." But see Kuhn, Title IX: Employment and Athletics are Outside 
HEW's Jurisdiction, 65 GEO. L.J. 49 (1976) (because athletic programs are not programs 
Women's Law Forum 
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HEW's Title IX. regulations which specifically encompass 
sports.25 
HEW has the authority to issue regulations concerning ath-
letics and to ensure they are implemented.26 Title IX. provides 
that the regulations must effectuate the purpose of the statute 
in educational programs or activities that receive federal 
financial assistance.27 Legislative his~ory clearly indicates that 
the goal of the statute is elimination of sex discrimination in ed-
ucational institutions that receive federal funds. HEW interprets 
the statutory mandate to mean that a program "will be subject 
to the requirements of the regulation if it receives or benefits 
from federal assistance . . . ."28 Federal financial assistance is 
defined as any grant or loan by the government to the educa-
tional institution that may then be used for anything from resto-
or activities which receive direct financial assistance within the meaning of the statute, 
they are exempt from HEW regulation). 
25. See 43 Fed. Reg. 18,774 (1978), which notes: 
"Under Section 431(d) and (f) of the General Education Pro-
visions Act; HEW was required to submit any Title IX regula-
tion to Congress for review 45 days before its effective date. 
During the 45-day period, the law allows Congress, by concur-
rent resolution, to disapprove the regulation in whole or in 
part." 
Though several resolutions were considered, they were ultimately rejected by the House 
Postsecondary Education Subcommittee. But see Gaal, & DiLoremo supra note 24, at 
166 n.30, which asserts that failure of Congress to disapprove regulations, although indi-
rect evidence of congressional intent, may not be construed as approval of regulations. 
[d. 
26. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1976). The section provides: 
27. [d. 
Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to 
extend Federal financial assistance to any education program 
or activity, by way of grant, loan or contract other than a con-
tract of insurance or guaranty, is authorized and directed to 
effectuate the provisions of section 1681 [20 U.S.C. Section 
1681] with respect to such program or activity by issuing rules, 
regulations, or orders of general applicability which shall be 
consistent with achievement of the objectives of the statute 
authorizing the financial assistance in connection with which 
the action is taken. 
28. 40 Fed. Reg. 24,128 (1975). 
Under analogous cases involving constitutional prohibitions 
against racial discrimination, the courts have held that the ed-
ucation functions of a school district or college include any 
service, facility, activity or program which it operates or spon-
sors, including athletics and other extracurricular activities. 
These precedents have been followed with regard to sex dis-
crimination .••• 
9
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ration to scholarships.29 According to HEW, intercollegiate ath-
letics are clearly educational programs or activities that receive 
federal financial assistance.3o Although the athletic programs 
may not receive direct assistance, they are still subject to Title 
IX's broad prohibition against sex discrimination if they benefit 
from federal funds.31 If an educational institution fails to comply 
[d. 
29. 40 Fed. Reg. 24,137 (1975): 
Federal financial assistance means any of the following, when 
authorized or extended under a law administered by the 
Department: 
(1) A grant or loan of Federal financial assistance, includ-
ing funds made available for: 
(i) The acquisition, construction, renovation, resto-
ration or repair of a building or facility or any portion 
thereof; and 
(ii) Scholarships, loans, grants, wages or other 
funds extended to any entity for payment to or on be-
half of students admitted to that entity, or extended di-
rectly to such students for payments to that entity. 
(2) A grant of Federal real or personal property or any 
interest therein, including surplus property, and the proceeds 
of the sale or transfer of such property, if the Federal share of 
the fair market value of the property is not, upon such sale or 
transfer, properly accounted for to the Federal Government. 
(3) Provision of the services of Federal personnel. 
(4) Sale or lease of Federal property or any interest 
therein at nominal consideration, or at consideration reduced 
for the purpose of assisting the recipient or in recognition of 
public interest to be served thereby, or permission to use Fed-
eral property or any interest therein without consideration. 
(5) Any other contract, agreement or arrangement which 
has as one of its purposes the provision of assistance to any 
education program or activity, except a contract of insurance 
of guaranty. 
30. In our opinion, a revenue-producing intercollegiate athletic 
program is (a) an education program or activity within the 
meaning of Title IX, and (b) an integral part of the general 
undergraduate education program of an institution of higher 
education. Accordingly, in our opinion, an institution of higher 
education must comply with the prohibition against sex dis-
crimination imposed by that title and its implementing regula-
tions in the administration of any revenue-producing intercol-
legiate athletic activity if either the athletic activity or the 
general education program of which the athletic activity is a 
part is receiving Federal financial assistance. 
Memorandum of F. Peter Libassi, HEW General Counsel, reprinted in 43 Fed Reg. 
58,075 (1978). 
31. HEW derives authority for its "benefiting" approach from Bob Jones Univ. v. 
Johnson, 396 F. Supp. 597 (D.S.C. 1974), aff'd. mem., 529 F.2d 514 (4th Cir. 1975). The 
district court held that direct payments to veterans under federal assistance statutes 
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with the regulatory provisions of Title IX, federal financial assis-
constituted federal financial assistance to the university under Title VI. The court listed 
three reasons for this conclusion: 
(1) [p]ayments to veterans enrolled at approved schools 
serve to defray the costs of the educational program of the 
schools thereby releasing institutional funds which would, in 
the absence of federal assistance, be spent on the student. • • 
(2) [t]he participation of veterans who-but for the avail-
ability of federal funds-would not enter the educational pro-
grams of the approved school, benefits the school by enlarging 
the pool of qualified applicants upon which it can draw for its 
educational program • • • , and 
(3) [t]he historical development of federal educational 
benefits for veterans persuasively indicates that the statutes in 
question are covered in Title VI. 
396 F. Supp. at 602-03. The court further noted that "[a]lthough the VA payments are 
not earmarked for school related expenditures, e.g., tuition, all that is necessary for Title 
VI purposes is a showing that the infusion of federal money through payments to veter-
ans assists the educational program of the approved school." Id. at 603 n.22. The court 
based its finding of discrimination under Title VI on the university's refusal to admit 
"unmarried nonwhites" due to their belief that "intergration of the student body would 
lead to inter-racial marriage thereby violating God's command." Id. at 600. The court 
found that the admissions policy constituted discrimination in a program which received 
federal financial assistance. See Gaal & DiLorenzo, supra note 24, at 170-71 (courts rec-
ognize role of athletics in overall educational program); 40 Fed. Reg. 24,128 (1975): 
Id. 
Section 86.11 in Subpart B, provides that the regulation ap-
plies 'to each education program or activity which receives or 
benefits from Federal financial assistance' administered by the 
Department. Under analogous cases involving constitutional 
prohibitions against racial discrimination, the courts have held 
that the education functions of a school district or college in-
clude any service, facility, activity or program which it oper-
ates or sponsors, including athletics and other extracurricular 
activities. These precedents have been followed with regard to 
sex discrimination • • • • 
But see Note, Title IX Se:c Discrimination Regulations: Impact on Private Education, 
65 Ky. L.J. 656, 686 (1977), in which the author maintains that HEW cannot rely on Bob 
Jones as authority for the contention that "money given to one entity within the univer-
sity frees money to be used elsewhere •••• " 
The district court for the Eastern District of Michigan recently held that Title IX 
"extends only to those education programs or activities which receive direct financial 
assistance." Othen v. Ann Arbor School Bd., 507 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (Mem-
orandum Opinion and Order on file at the Golden Gate University Law Review Office.). 
The amended complaint alleged the school board had violated Title IX, as well as two 
state statutes, by excluding plaintiff's daughters from the Pioneer High School golf team. 
Id. at 2. Additionally, the complaint alleged that the refusal by the school to provide a 
"separate boys' and girls' golf team was a denial of [plaintiff's] daughters' rights to equal 
education opportunities." Id. Although the school board subsequently formed a separate 
golf team for girls, the court considered whether plaintiff could have prevailed under 
Title IX in order to resolve the remaining claim for attorney fees. Id. at 4. The primary 
issue was whether Title IX mandates an institutional approach, in which case it would 
apply to any institution receiving federal funds regardless of whether these funds go 
11
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tance may be withdrawn, S2 although Congress retains the right 
to review and reject any proposed cut-off within thirty days of 
the decision to terminate. ss Any decision by HEW to terminate 
public assistance is subject to judicial review.Sf 
Title IX provides that termination or refusal of funds for 
failure to comply with the statute "shall be limited in its effect 
to the particular program or activity or part thereof in which 
noncompliance has been found. "S5 HEW reads this language as 
giving it authority to terminate any federal funds received by a 
directly to the athletic program, or a programmatic approach which essentially requires 
that a specific program, to be subject to Title IX, must receive direct federal funding. In 
reaching its conclusion that the statute mandates a programmatic approach, the court 
totally discounted earlier case interpretations construing Title VI. The court distin-
guished these cases by finding that racial discrimination affects all educational programs 
and activities while sex discrimination is perceived as affecting only the specific athletic 
program under attack. This assessment fails to acknowledge or consider the legislative 
history of Title IX. See Sex Discrimination Hearings, supra note 14 and accompanying 
text. Additionally, discrimination in the athletic program may only be a "surface indica-
tor of a broader based pattern or policy of sex discrimination at the university." Gaal & 
DiLorenzo, supra note 24, at 172. See also note 47 infra and accompanying text. 
At least two recent district court decisions found that a university will be subject to 
Title IX even though federal funds may not go directly to the organizations or programs 
under review. See Iron Arrow Honor Soc'y v. Califano, 597 F.Supp. 590 (S.D. Fla. 1980); 
Grove City College v. Harris, 500 F. Supp. 253 (W.D. Penn. 1980.) HEW athletic regula-
tions require Title IX compliance in every program and activity administered by a uni-
versity which receives or benefits from federal funds. Even when the only form of fund-
ing is federally guaranteed student loans, under Grove City, the university will be subject 
to the requirements of Title IX. These cases reflect the legislative purpose behind Title 
IX and are consistent with HEW's interpretation of the statute. The conclusion reached 
in Othen v. Ann Arbor School Bd., supra, by contrast, contradicts the construction 
placed on Title IX by most authorities. 
Id. 
32. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1976). 
33.Id. 
Compliance with any requirement adopted pursuant to this 
section may be effected (1) by the termination of or refusal to 
grant or to continue assistance under such program or activity 
to any recipient as to whom there has been an express finding 
on the record, after opportunity for hearing, of a failure to 
comply with such requirement, but such termination or refusal 
shall be limited to the particular political entity, or part 
thereof, or other recipient as to whom such finding has been 
made, and shall be limited in its effect to the particular pro-
gram, or part thereof, in which such noncompliance has been 
so found. • • • • 
34. Id. § 1683. 
35. Id. § 1682. For full text of the provision, see note 32 supra. 
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school when that school violates Title IX.36 Thus, if a school's 
intercollegiate athletics program runs afoul of Title IX regula-
tions or guidelines, HEW has the power to terminate federal 
funds received by the athletic program as well as funds received 
by any other school programs that are found to be tainted by 
the discrimination in the athletic program.3 '1 
HEW relies on Board of Public Instruction v. Finch38 for 
this interpretation, despite the fact that the specific holding of 
Finch does not support HEW's reading of the statute. In Finch, 
the Fifth Circuit reviewed an order of HEW cutting off all fed-
eral funds received by the school district because of a violation 
of Title VI.39 To determine whether HEW had the authority to 
terminate funds for three different school programs,40 the court 
construed a provision of Title VI that is virtually identical to 
that of Title IX.41 The court held that the term "program" did 
36. 40 Fed. Reg. 24,128 (1975). 
Title IX requires in 20 U.S.C. 1682 that termination or refusal 
to grant or continue assistance 'shall be limited in its effect to 
the particular education program or activity or part thereof in 
which noncompliance has been found.' The interpretation of 
this provision in Title IX will be consistent with the interpre-
tation of similar language contained in Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000d-1). Therefore, an educa-
tion program or activity or part thereof operated by a recipi-
ent of Federal financial assistance administered by the De-
partment will be subject to the requirements of this regulation 
if it receives or benefits from such assistance. This interpreta-
tion is consistent with the only case specifically ruling on the 
language contained in Title VI, which holds that Federal 
funds may be terminated under Title VI upon a finding that 
they 'are infected by a discriminatory environment . . • .' 
Board of Pub. Instruction v. Finch, 414 F.2d 1068, 1078-79 (5th Cir. 1969). 
37. 40 Fed. Reg. 24,128 (1975). 
38. 414 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1969). 
39. ld. at 1071. When meetings between HEW and school officials failed to remedy 
the problem, General Counsel for HEW initiated administrative proceedings which con-
firmed the school district's failure to comply with the Title VI regulations and imple-
menting guidelines. Based on this determination, HEW entered an order terminating 
federal financial assistance to the school district. 
40. ld. at 1074. "Three separate and distinct federal programs are here involved. 
One concerns federal aid for the education of children of low income families; one in-
volves grants for supplementary educational centers; the third provides special grants for 
the education of adults who have not received a college education." ld. 
41. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1976). The statute provides: 
Compliance with any requirement adopted pursuant to this 
section may be effected (1) by the termination of or refusal to 
grant or to continue assistance under such program or activity 
13
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not mean "school program" as HEW contended.42 Rather, "pro-
gram" means "a particular program, within a state, within a 
county, within a district, even within a school"43 which is cov-
ered by an individual grant statute (a congressional statute au-
thodzing funding to specific school programs). The court con-
cluded that in terminating funds, HEW must review each 
individual program for discrimination and "must make findings 
of fact indicating either that a particular program is itself ad-
ministered in a discriminatory manner, or is so affected by dis-
criminatory practices elsewhere in' the school system that it 
thereby becomes discriminatory."44 
Dicta in Finch, however, does lend support to HEW's posi-
tion that it has broad authority to terminate funds under Title 
IX. The Finch court, for example, noted that if funds provided 
by a grant "support a program which is infected by a dis crimina-
to any recipient or to whom there has been an express finding 
on the record, after opportunity for hearing, of a failure to 
comply with such requirement, but such termination or refusal 
shall be limited to the particular political entity, or part 
thereof, or other recipient as to whom such a finding has been 
made and, shall be limited in its effect to the particular pro-
gram, or part thereof, in which such noncompliance has been 
so found .••• 
Finch is the only case thus far to rule on the language of this provision. 
[d. 
42. 414 F.2d at 1077. 
We must also reject HEW's interpretation of the term "pro-
gram" as that term is used in the statute. While it is true as 
HEW points out that during the Senate debate on Section 602 
of the Act (42 U.S.C.A. Section 2000d-1) fears were expressed 
that termination of aid to schools might also lead to termina-
tion of aid to roads and highways, see 110 Congo Rec. 7059 
(1964); 110 Congo Rec. 7067 (1964), such expressions of con-
cern do not mark the inner limits of the term 'program'. In the 
first place the statute requires that termination be limited 'to 
the particular program, or part thereof' [emphasis added] 
found not in compliance with the Act. Even if 'program' 
meant school program, as HEW contends, some meaning 
would have to be assigned to the parenthetical phrase, 'or part 
thereof.' The logical candidate would be the individual grant 
statutes which constitute the so-called 'school program.' 
43. 414 F.2d at 1078. The language "even within a school" (emphasis ad-
ded)-considered with other language in the opinion-suggests that the range of activi-
ties covered by the term "program" broadens as the unit under examination narrows. 
See notes 44-47 infra and accompanying text. 
44. 414 F.2d at 1079. 
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tory environment," then HEW has the power to terminate those 
funds.415 The court also cautioned that, in demanding a program 
by program review of discrimination, "we do not mean to indi-
cate that a program must be considered in isolation from its con-
text."46 The point at which one discriminating program will be 
found to infect another is unclear but one commentator suggests 
that "discrimination in an intercollegiate program infects both 
the physical education program and the general education pro-
gram."47 HEW's interpretation of Finch serves to enhance its 
own regulatory power to effectuate the purposes of Title IX. 
II. THE REGULATIONS 
A. THE PROPOSED REGULATIONS 
On June 20, 1974, HEW issued its proposed regulations.48 
Section 86.38 of the regulations bars discrimination on the basis 
of sex in a recipient institution's physical education and athletic 
45. ld. at 1078. But see Kuhn, supra note 24, at 68-70 (HEW has expanded the 
infection theory beyond the scope permitted by court in Finch); NCAA v. Califano, 622 
F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1980) (challenging HEW's interpretation and implementation of 
Title IX). In YALE Note, supra note 4, at 1256 n.15, the author contends that "despite 
these challenges, it seems likely that HEW's interpretations will be upheld, since its ap-
proach to Title IX parallels its interpretation of a similar provision in Title VI •..• " 
46. 414 F.2d at 1078-79. . 
47. Gaal & DiLorenzo, supra note 24, at 172. Gaal and DiLorenzo justify this state-
ment as follows: 
As noted above, it is generally accepted that the intercollegi-
ate athletic program is an integral part of the general educa-
tional program. The infectious impact of discrimination in 
athletic programs is not difficult to visualize. Such discrimina-
tion is likely to deter any woman serious about athletics from 
enrolling at the discriminating institution. Additionally, po-
tential female students may well view discrimination in athlet-
ics as a surface indicator of a broader based pattern or policy 
of sex discrimination at the university. In either event, athletic 
discrimination, by influencing general admissions, might be 
construed as infecting the overall educational program. 
ld. The Department's views are stated at 40 Fed. Reg. 24,134 (1975): 
Paragraph 86.41(a) provides that athletics must be operated 
without discrimination on the basis of sex. The Department 
continues to take the position that athletics constitute an inte-
gral part of the educational processes of schools and colleges 
and, as such, are fully subject to the requirements of Title IX 
even in the absence of Federal funds going directly to 
athletics. 
(Emphasis added.) 
48. 39 Fed. Reg. 22,228-40 (1974). 
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programs.49 HEW cites Brenden v. Independent School District 
742,110 as authority in asserting general Title IX jurisdiction over 
such athletic programs. lSI In Brenden, two female high school 
students were not allowed to participate in interscholastic ten-
nis, cross-county skiing, and cross-country running. They sued 
the school district under the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment to the United States Constitution.1S2 Plain-
tiffs alleged that the league rulelSs prevented them from playing 
on the existing boys' teams in these sports even though the girls 
could compete effectively on these teams.54 No separate team 
was provided for girls by their schools in these sports. ISIS The dis-
trict court cited Title IX as evidence of congressional intent "to 
eliminate discrimination based on stereotyped characterizations 
of the sexes."ISS In affirming the district court's decision, the 
Eighth Circuit held that plaintiffs must be allowed to participate 
on their school's teams, and enjoined the high school league 
from imposing sanctions on the high schools for compliance with 
the order.1S7 The court based its decision, in part, on the findings 
of the President's Task Force on Women's RightslS8 and on testi-
49. [d. at 22,230. 
50. 477 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1973). 
51. 39 Fed. Reg. at 22,230 (1974). 
52. 477 F.2d at 1294. Cases brought under the fourteenth amendment of the United 
States Constitution are filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). The statute offers a right of 
action for "the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Consti-
tution and laws ..• " of the United States. . 
53. The Minnesota State High School League rule stated: "Girls shall be prohibited 
from participation in the boys' interscholastic athletic program either as a member of the 
boys' team or a member of the girls' team playing the boys' team." 477 F.2d at 1294. 
54. [d. 
55. [d. 
56. [d. at 1296. 
57. Quoting the district court, the Eighth Circuit stated: 
[d. at 1294. 
In summary, the Court is confronted with a situation where 
two high school girls wish to take part in certain interscholas-
tic boys' athletics; where it is shown that the girls could com-
pete effectively on those teams; and where there are no alter-
native competitive programs sponsored by their schools which 
would provide an equal opportunity for competition for these 
girls; and where the rule, in its application, becomes unreason-
able in light of the objectives which the rule seeks to promote. 
Brought to its base, then, Peggy Brenden and Tony St. Pierre 
are being prevented from participating in the boys' interscho-
lastic teams in tennis, cross-country, and cross-country skiing 
solely on the basis of the fact of sex and sex alone. 
58. 477 F.2d at 1298. See note 14 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of 
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mony from the Sex Discrimination Hearings.1I9 One author notes 
that "Brenden therefore reflected the new national policy 
against sex discrimination in education."60 
The proposed regulations, reflecting the holding in Brenden, 
included specific procedures designed to eliminate sex discrimi-
nation in intercollegiate athletic programs.61 Perhaps the most 
promising feature of the regulation-later deleted from the final 
version-was the requirement that the recipient institutions af-
firmatively attempt to accommodate the interests and abilities 
of women.62 Section 86.38(c)63 defined affirmative efforts as 1) 
informing women of their opportunity to participate in athletics, 
and 2) providing them with support and training designed to en-
hance their athletic abilities.M As part of the affirmative action 
mandate, HEW required each institution to make an annual as-
sessment of those sports in which members of each sex wanted 
to participate.611 One commentator has stated that, "[b]y making 
the interests of the student body, and particularly female stu-
dents, the primary determinant of which sports would be spon-
sored, the [proposed] regulation would have revolutionized in-
tercollegiate athletics."66 The affirmative action section was the 
most dramatic indication of HEW's determination to implement 
the goals of Title IX. 
HEW solicited comments from interested individuals and 
organizations67 soon after the Office for Civil Rights68 gave no-
tice of the proposed regulations. HEW received nearly 10,000 re-
this report. 
59. 477 F.2d at 1298. See note 14 supra and accompanying text for summary of 
content of hearings. In delineating the widespread practice of discrimination against wo-
men, the Sex Discrimination Hearings were an important influence on Congress in enact-
ing Title IX. 
60. See Todd, Title IX of the 1972 Education Amendments: Preventing Sex Dis-
crimination in Public Schools, 53 TEx L. REv. 103, 107 (1974). "Thus, Brenden may 
provide the foundation on which the first cases decided under Title IX will build." Id. 
61. 39 Fed. Reg. 22,230 (1974). 
62. Id. at 22,236. 
63.Id. 
64.Id. 
65.Id. 
66. Cox, supra note 4, at 52. 
67. 40 Fed. Reg. 24,128 (1975). 
68. OCR is responsible for the enforcement of Title IX. See note 169 infra and ac-
companying text. 
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sponses.69 The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) 
urged that intercollegiate revenue-producing sports be exempt 
from Title IX.70 Although HEW did not adopt this proposal, it 
did delete the affirmative efforts requirement due to confusion 
over how the annual student poll was to be conducted and the 
apparent misinterpretation of the provision relating to equal op-
portunity.71 These deletions indicate the continuing controversy 
over the extent to which Title IX will penetrate the tra:ditionally 
male-dominated arena of intercollegiate athletics. If affirmative 
efforts are no longer required, Title IX's broad prohibition 
against sex discrimination may be weakened. A comparison of 
the final regulations with the proposed regulations reflects the 
impact of the NCAA's lobbying efforts.72 
B. THE FINAL REGULATIONS 
The final regulations became effective on July 21, 1975.78 
Section 86.41 sets forth the provisions governing athletics.7• The 
69. A substantial number of comments was received by the De-
partment on the various issues raised concerning the athletic 
provisions of the proposed regulation. Numerous comments 
were received favoring a proposal submitted by the National 
Col)egiate Athletic Association that the revenue earned by 
revenue-producing sports be exempted from coverage under 
this regulation. Other comments were submitted against this 
proposal. 
Id. at 24,134. 
70. Id. See Sex Discrimination Hearings, supra note 14; YALE Note, supra note 4, 
at 1257. 
Id. 
71. 40 Fed. Reg. 24,134 (1975). 
Paragraph 86.38(c) of the proposed regulation required all re-
cipients sponsoring athletic activities to take certain affirma-
tive efforts with regard to members of the sex for which ath-
letic opportunities have been limited notwithstanding the lack 
of any findings of discrimination. Since such a requirement 
could be considered "affirmative action," and was somewhat 
inconsistent with Section 86.3, it has been deleted. 
72. See Cox, supra note 4, at 63; YALE Note, supra note 4, at 1257. "Impassioned 
commentary and lobbying by the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) and 
others however, led HEW to issue significantly narrower final regulations in 1975." Id. 
73. 40 Fed. Reg. 24,128 (1975) (codified at 45 C.F.R. Part 86). The final regulations 
specifically authorized a three-year adjustment period for "a recipient which operates or 
sponsors interscholastic athletics at the secondary or post-secondary school leveL" Id. at 
24,143. This adjustment period ended July 21, 1978. 
74. 45 C.F.R. § 86.41 (1980). Section 86.41 of the regulation states: 
(a) General. No person shall, on the 'basis of sex, be ex-
cluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, be 
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section begins with a general prohibition against sex discrimina-
treated differently from another person or otherwise be dis-
criminated against in any interscholastic, intercollegiate, club 
or intramural athletics offered by a recipient, and no recipient 
shall provide any such athletics separately on such basis. 
(b) Separate teams. Notwithstanding the requirements of 
paragraph (a) of this section, a recipient may operate or spon-
sor separate teams for members of each sex where selection for 
such teams is based upon competitive skill or the activity in-
volved is a contact sport. However, where a recipient operates 
or sponsors a team in a particular sport for members of one 
sex but operates or sponsors no such team for members of the 
other sex, and athletic opportunities for members of that sex 
have previously been limited, members of the excluded sex 
must be allowed to try-out for the team offered unless the 
sport involved is a contact sport. For the purposes of this part, 
contact sports include boxing, wrestling, rugby, ice hockey, 
football, basketball and other sports the purpose of major ac-
tivity of which involves bodily contact. 
(c) Equal Opportunity. A recipient which operates or 
sponsors interscholastic, intercollegiate, club or intramural 
athletics shall provide equal athletic opportunity for members 
of both sexes. In determining whether equal opportunities are 
available, the Director will consider, among other factors: 
(1) Whether the selection of sports and levels of competi-
tion effectively accommodate the interests and abilities of 
members of both sexes; 
(2) The provision of equipment and supplies; 
(3) Scheduling of games and practice time; 
(4) Travel and per diem allowance; 
(5) Opportunity to receive coaching and academic 
tutoring; 
(6) Assignment and compensation of coaches and tutors; 
(7) Provision of locker rooms, practice and competitive 
facilities; 
(8) Provision of medical and training facilities and 
services; 
(9) Provision of housing and dining facilities and services; 
(10) Publicity. 
Unequal aggregate expenditures for members of each sex or 
unequal expenditures for male and female teams if a recipient 
operates or sponsors separate teams will not constitute non-
compliance with this section, but the Director may consider 
the failure to provide necessary funds for teams for one sex in 
assessing equality of opportunity for members of each sex. 
(d) Adjustment Period. A recipient which operates or 
sponsors interscholastic, intercollegiate, club or intramural 
athletics at the elementary school level shall comply fully with 
this section as expeditiously as possible but in no event later 
than one year from the effective date of this regulation. A re-
cipient which operates or sponsors interscholastic, intercollegi-
ate, club or intramural athletics at the secondary or post-sec-
ondary school level shall comply fully with this section as 
19
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tion in "any interscholastic, intercollegiate, club or intramural 
athletics offered by recipient" institutions.'15 Subsection (b) al-
lows a college or university to operate sex-segregated teams 
when team selection is based on competitive skill.'16 The final 
regulations also added an exception for contact sports, which has 
since become a controversial aspect of the regulations.'1'1 Sepa-
rate teams are allowed for boxing, wrestling, rugby, ice hockey, 
football, basketball, and other sports that involve bodily con-
tact.'18 Under the regulations, a female athle.te is not allowed to 
try out for a contact sports team, despite the fact that her ath-
letic opportunities may have previously been limited in this 
sport.'19 These two exceptions exclude many women from partici-
pation because competitive skill in team selection is almost al-
ways a factor and because contact sports, most notably football 
and basketball, comprise the major athletic events at most col-
leges and universities. 
Section 86.41(c) of the final regulations sets forth criteria by 
which HEW will measure whether recipient institutions provide 
equal opportunity in athletics.8o The first and most important 
criterion is "[w]hether the selection of sports and levels of com-
petition effectively accommodates the interests and abilities of 
both sexes .... "81 HEW will consider ten factorss2 to determine 
whether this provision has been met. These factors allow HEW 
to assess institutional compliance by measuring the availability 
and quality of specific items, such as the provision of equipment 
and supplies, travel and per diem allowances, and the provision 
of housing and dining facilities. S8 Equal aggregate expenditures 
for each sex or for sex-segregated teams are not required, but 
HEW may compare the funds provided for each sex in each cat-
expeditiously as possible but in no event later than three years 
from the effective date of this regulation. 
75. ld. § 86.41(a). 
76. ld. § 86.41(b). 
77. ld. "The contact sports exception is difficult to justify, either on the basis of 
physical differences between the sexes or as a matter of statutory interpretation." Cox, 
supra note 4, at 44. See note 154 infra. 
78. 45 C.F.R. § 86.41(b) (1980). 
79.ld. . 
80.ld. 
81. ld. 
82. ld. See note 74 supra, for text of this subsection. 
83.ld. 
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egory to determine whether the institution is providing equality 
of opportunity for both sexes.54 The remaining sections of the 
final regulations set forth the adjustment period85 and the re-
quirements for athletic scholarships.86 
The final regulations, although retaining the important 
equal opportunity provision, differ from the proposed regula-
tions in several important respects. By deleting the affirmative 
efforts section, HEW has substantially reduced an institution's 
responsibility for effective and immediate compliance with the 
mandates of Title IX. The proposed regulations required dis-
semination of information concerning the availability of athletic 
opportunities. Additionally, they required training activities 
designed to expand and improve athletic capabilities. These sec-
tions were eliminated from the final version. By adding the con-
tact sports exception, HEW provided yet another loophole 
through which institutions may avoid compliance with the pur-
pose of Title IX. As a result, the final regulations retreat from 
the coverage of the proposed procedures.87 
ID. THE POLICY INTERPRETATION 
To clarify the meaning of the final regulations and to pro-
vide athletic programs with detailed guidelines for compliance 
with Title IX, HEW issued a proposed and then a final set of 
policy guidelines. The proposed policy interpretation was issued 
December 11, 1978.88 During the public comment period that 
84.ld. 
85. ld. § 86.41(d). 
86. ld. § 86.37(c). This subsection provides: 
Athletic scholarships. (1) To the extent that a recipient 
awards athletic scholarships or grants-in-aid, it must provide 
reasonable opportunities for such awards for members of each 
sex in proportion to the number of students of each sex partic-
ipating in interscholastic or intercollegiate athletics. 
(2) Separate athletic scholarships or grants-in-aid for 
members of each sex may be provided as part of separate ath-
letic teams for members of each sex to the extent consistent 
with this paragraph and § 86.41. 
87. "The final HEW regulation apparently retreated from the proposed regulation 
by adding the contact sports exception, deleting the language requiring 'affirmative ef-
forts' to increase opportunities for women, and dropping the annual 'determination of 
student interest' requirement." Cox, supra note 4, at 63. 
88. 43 Fed. Reg. 58,070-76 (1978). 
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followed, HEW received more than 700 responses.89 HEW staff 
members visited eight universities during June and July of 1979 
to observe how the proposed policy would apply in actual prac-
tice.90 Based on these observations, and the nearly 100 com-
plaints alleging discrimination in athletics against more than 50 
institutions, HEW decided that it should provide further gui-
dance, primarily concerning the application of Title IX to inter-
collegiate athletic programs.91 The result was the final·policy in-
terpretation, issued December 4, 1979.92 The final policy 
interpretation merits extensive discussion both because it 
presents the fullest statement of how HEW will determine stat-
utory compliance, and because the courts must consider the 
guidelines when deciding cases of alleged sex discrimination in 
athletics.93 The policy interpretation does not have the full force 
and effect of law,94 but a reviewing court is required to give 
"great deference" to an agency's interpretation of the statute.SG 
Because the guidelines set forth in the final policy are based on 
approved regulations and therefore have a reasonable basis in 
law, they carry substantial weight in determinations of institu-
tional compliance with Title IX.s6 
The guidelines underwent substantial changes between issu-
ance of the proposed and final policies. The changes cannot be 
89. 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413 (1979). 
9O.ld. 
9!. ld. The proposed policy interpretation was designed specifically for intercollegi-
ate athletics. The general guidelines, however, can apply to club, intramural, and inter-
scholastic athletic programs, all of which are covered by the regulations. ld. 
92. 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413 (1979). The final policy interpretation became effective De-
cember 11, 1979. 
93. See note 95 infra. 
94. Because HEW has complied with publication rules similar to the regulations and 
steps have been taken to submit the final policy to Congress for review, however, HEW 
may claim that the guidelines have the full force and effect of law. Gaal & DiLorenzo, 
supra note 24, at 163 n.12. 
95. See Fredericks v. Kreps, 578 F.2d 555 (5th Cir. 1978) (if interpretation given a 
statute by agency charged with its administration is reasonable, a court must sustain the 
agency's actions even though the court might consider an alternative approach more rea-
sonable); Staebler v. Carter, 464 F. Supp. 585 (D.D.C. 1979) (in seeking to construe 
meaning of statutory provision, great, even decisive, weight should be accorded to the 
continuous practical construction accorded the provision by those with the responsibility 
to administer it); Cape Fox Corp. v. United States, 456 F. Supp. 784 (D. Alaska 1978) 
(great deference should be accorded to agency's interpretation of its own guidelines even 
though guidelines are not regulations). 
96. See Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965) (when construction of administrative 
regulation rather than statute is in issue, deference is even greater). 
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fully appreciated without a brief examination of the proposed 
policy. 
A. THE PROPOSED POLICY 
The proposed policy was based on two factors HEW consid-
ered important in establishing criteria for determining compli-
ance with the statute.97 First, most colleges and universities have 
traditionally emphasized sports for men.9S This emphasis has 
contributed to differences "in the number of sports and scope of 
competition offered to men and women.U99 Consequently, dis-
proportionately more aid has been made available for male ath-
letes than for female athletes.10o Second, despite the discrepan-
cies in coaching, equipment, access to facilities, publicity, and 
housing, women's participation in intercollegiate athletics in-
creased 100 percent during the period from 1971 to 1976.101 
Taking these factors into account, the department divided 
the proposed policy into two sections. The first, entitled "Elimi-
nating Discrimination in Existing Programs,"102 set forth a two-
part approach to determine whether a college or university had 
eliminated discrimination on the basis of sex in its existing pro-
grams.103 Part A of this section listed factors HEW considered 
important in determining whether an institution provided equal 
athletic opportunity. 1M Thus, for example, under this section an 
97. 43 Fed. Reg. 58,071 (1978). 
98. [d. Of the 395,000 students participating in intercollegiate sports in the aca-
demic year 1976-1977, 74% were men and 26% were women. HEW based these figures 
on data from the AIAW, which was based on participation data from the NCAA, the 
National Association of Intercollegiate Athletics (NAIA), and the National Junior Col-
lege Athletic Association (NJCAA). [d. at 58,071 n.6. 
99. 43 Fed. Reg. 58,071 (1978). "On the average, colleges and universities provide 
approximately ten sports for men and only six for women." [d. This finding is based on 
limited data from the NCAA. [d. at 58,071 n.7. 
100. 43 Fed. Reg. 58,071 (1978). As of 1978, the average annual scholarship budget 
was $39,000. Male athletes received 82% of this amount while female athletes received 
only 17.9% of the total, despite the fact that women constituted 26% of the participat-
ing athletes. These figures were obtained from the AIA W, STRUCTURE IMPLEMENTATION 
SURVEY DATA SUMMARY (1978). 43 Fed. Reg. 58,071 n.8 (1978). 
101. 43 Fed. Reg. 58,071 (1978). 
102. [d. at 58,072 (1978). 
103. [d. 
104. Part A provides: 
Equality of benefits and opportunities in many aspects of a 
recipient's intercollegiate athletic program can best be mea-
sured in financial terms. Financially measurable benefits and 
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institution would be found in compliance with this provision if it 
offered substantially equal average per capita funds to partici-
pating male and female athletes for scholarships, recruitment, 
and other financially measurable benefits.lo5 Part B focused on 
opportunities not financially measurable and provided a more 
expansive interpretation of the equal opportunity provisions of 
the regulations. lOS 
The second section of the proposed policy required affirma-
tive efforts by colleges and universities to effectively accomodate 
the athletic interests and abilities of both sexes.107 A recipient 
institution would be required to demonstrate that it included 
procedures designed to encourage women to participate, to in-
crease the number of women's sports, to publicize the athletic 
opportunities for women, and to elevate the scope of women's 
intercollegiate competition.los An institution choosing not to fol-
low these procedures could nevertheless satisfy the equal oppor-
tunity provision by demonstrating that the sports currently of-
fered to women were comparable to those offered to men.109 In 
addition, a university would be in compliance if it could show a 
pattern of increased participation by women and if it could 
demonstrate that the institution's athletic program reflected the 
athletic interests of women.110 
These procedures, similar to the affirmative efforts section 
found in the proposed regulations, III were deleted by HEW in 
ld. 
opportunities covered by the Title IX regulation [45 CFR 
86.41(c)] include but are not limited to: 
1. Financial assistance awarded on the basis of athletic 
ability; 
2. Recruitment of athletes; 
3. Provision and maintenance of equipment and supplies; 
4. Living and travel expenses related to competitive 
events; and 
5. Publicity. 
105. ld. at 58,073. See note 119 infra, for an example of a per capita formula based 
on the criteria set forth in the final policy. 
106. ld at 58,071. See note 74 supra, for text of the equal opportunity provision of 
the final regulation. 
107. 43 Fed. Reg. 58,074 (1978). 
108.ld. 
109.ld. 
110.ld. 
111. See notes 61-63 supra and accompanying text. 
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the final policy interpretation. A clear trend exists for the pro-
posed rules to embrace the more revolutionary goalsU2 which are 
then deleted from the final versions. This may be attributed in 
part to the efforts of special interest groups such as the NCAA, 
which exerted pressure on HEW through a well-organized na-
tional campaign geared to oppose HEW's interpretation of the 
statute.U3 These efforts effectively diluted the guidelines, al-
lowing a university to comply with the retained provisions while 
only minimally encouraging participation by female athletes. 
B. THE FINAL POLICY INTERPRETATION 
The final policy interpretation is divided into three sections, 
which will be examined in the order in which they appear. To 
judge whether the interpretation is compatible with the goals of 
Title IX, one must determine whether the policy is consistent 
with the statute and with the implementing regulations. HEW 
has expanded the jurisdictional scope of Title IX by stating that 
the final policy will apply to "any public or private institution, 
person or other entity that operates an educational program or 
activity which receives or benefits from financial assistance au-
thorized or extended under a law administered by the depart-
112. Both the proposed regulations and the proposed policy interpretation con-
tained sections which specifically required that affirmative efforts be made to encourage 
and upgrade the level of participation by women in intercollegiate sports. These proce-
dures were revolutionary because they would have forced institutions not only to equal-
ize opportunity for women, but to take steps in assuring that this opportunity be pro-
vided. See Cox, supra note 4, at 52. 
113. Women's Sports Face New Hurdles, On Campus With Women, Spring 1979, at 
1 [hereinafter cited as On Campus With Women].(Copies of the newsletter may be 
obtained from the Project on the Status and Education of Women, Ass'n of American 
Colleges, 1818 R Street, N.W., Washington, D.C., 20009.) The article offers a detailed 
account of the NCAA's lobbying efforts: . 
[d. at 1. 
The National Coalition for Women and Girls in Educa-
tion, which generally views the proposed policy as a positive 
step toward the implementation of Title IX, charges that the 
anti-Title IX mail currently flooding the Congress and HEW 
is not representative of the majority of institutions and indi-
viduals affected by the law, but the result of a well-financed 
lobbying effort by the NCAA and a few schools that have not 
taken steps to eliminate sex discrimination in their athletic 
programs. The Coalition also claims the national education 
associations are not representing the interests of those on 
campus in this matter, and that women lack the financial re-
sources and political sophistication needed to make their 
voices heard in Washington. 
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ment."1l4 Other changes in the final policy will be revealed by 
examining each of the three sections separately. 
Athletic Financial Assistance (Scholarships) 
Section A, entitled "Athletic Financial Assistance,"llll as-
sesses compliance with the scholarship provisions of the regula-
tion.1l6 Under this section, HEW will conduct a "financial com-
parison to determine whether proportionately equal amounts of 
financial assistance are available to men's and women's athletic 
programs."ll'1 According to former Secretary Patricia Roberts 
Harris, this means that "if 70 percent of a school's athletes are 
male, they are entitled to 70 percent of the financial aid dollars 
their school makes available."lls HEW will evaluate an institu-
tion's award of financial assistance by determining the amount 
of aid available to men and then dividing that amount by the 
number of men who participate in the athletic program.1l9 It will 
114. 44 Fed. Reg. 71,414 (1978). 
The new interpretation's statement attempts to expand con-
siderably HEW's jurisdiction by shifting the focus from "pro-
grams" in receipt of federal aid to "institutions" in receipt of 
federal aid. Under this more recent pronouncement, coverage 
of an athletic program will be asserted if the institution itself 
merely receives or benefits from federal financial assistance re-
gardless of any specific benefit to the athletic program. 
Gaal, DiLorenzo & Evans, HEW's Final 'Policy Interpretation" of Title IX and Inter-
collegiate Athletics, 6 J. COLL. & U.L. 345, 352 (1980). 
115. 44 Fed. Reg. 71,415 (1979). 
116. Id. See note 86 supra. 
117. 44 Fed. Reg. 71,415 (1979). 
118. Press Conference of Patricia Roberts Harris, former Secretary of HEW (Dec. 4, 
1979). 
119. This interpretation of the scholarship provision and the following hypothetical 
are based on a telephone interview with Lionel S. Sobel, Esq. (Oct. 21, 1980) [hereinafter 
cited as Sobel Interview]. For example, if the aggregate amount available is $300,000 and 
there are 300 male athletes, the amount per participant would be $1,000. Correspond-
ingly, if the aggregate amount available for female athletes is $100,000 and there are 100 
participants, the amount per athlete would come to $1,000. Based on this hypothetical, 
the institution would be in compliance. A possible violation may occur where only 
$80,000 is made available to the women's program but there are 100 participants, in 
which case the amount per athlete would be only $800. If this discrepancy is based on 
non-discriminatory factors, however, the institution may still be in compliance despite 
the unequal allocation. See 44 Fed. Reg. 71,415 (1979). See notes 122-125 infra for exam-
ples of nondiscriminatory factors. 
HEW defines "participants" as those athletes: 
a. Who are receiving the institutionally-sponsored support 
normally provided to athletes competing at the institution in-
volved, e.g., coaching, equipment, medical and training room 
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also determine the amount of aid made available to women and 
will divide that amount by the number of female athletes.12o Ide-
ally, the resulting per capita amount of aid available to men 
should be the same as the per capita amount available to wo-
men.121 HEW will allow universities to justify some funding dis-
parities by showing that nondiscriminatory factors caused the 
resulting differences.122 These factors may include tuition for 
out-of-state students or a decision to spread the scholarship 
money over a full generation of athletes.123 For example, if 95 
football players-75 of whom come from out-of-state-receive 
scholarships, HEW may allow an imbalance in the resulting 
averages because tuition for these players is higher.12' An ath-
letic director may also arbitrarily decide that the available schol-
arship money should be distributed over a four-year period for 
purposes of team development. Although twelve basketball 
scholarships may be available for women, the athletic director 
may choose to allocate three full scholarships per year for four 
years.1215 HEW will allow this kind of per capita distribution de-
spite the resulting disparity in the average amount of scholar-
ship aid provided for men and women. Because Section A does 
not require that a proportionate number of scholarships be of 
equal> dollar value, the manner in which expenditures can be 
made for men and women continue to differ substantially. us 
services, on a regular basis during a sport's season; and 
b. Who are participating in organized practice sessions 
and other team meetings and activities on a regular basis dur-
ing a sport's season; and 
c. Who are listed on the eligibility or squad lists main-
tained for each sport; or 
d. Who, because of injury, canIlot meet fl, b or c above but 
continue to receive financial aid on the basis of athletic ability. 
44 Fed. Reg. 71,415 (1979). 
120. 44 Fed. Reg. 71,415 (1979). 
121. ld. 
122. ld. See note 119 supra. 
123.ld. 
124. Sobel Interview, supra note 119. 
125.ld. 
126. As a result of NCAA rules applicable to scholarships, for example, male ath-
letes who participate in football and basketball are routinely offered full scholarships 
despite the fact that they are not required to show a financial need for the money: 
NCAA regulations permit a maximum of 95 "full ride" grants-
in-aid (tuition, room and board) for football athletes and 15 
"full ride" grants-in-aid for basketball athletes. Almost all 
athletes in these two sports, in other words, are permitted to 
be on full scholarship. Recent efforts by Division I institutions 
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The men's program may award full scholarships to some of its 
athletes while the women's program may offer partial scholar-
ships to a larger number of athletes.127 Although women would 
receive smaller awards than those men who receive awards, this 
would not violate the policy's standard. 
Despite the need for incentives to upgrade the levels of 
competition available to women's teams, an institution might ar-
. tificially restrict the development of these teams to keep costs 
down.128 Because there is no time limit on deferral of scholarship 
funds, nor any requirement that the funds actually be carried 
forward and made available for the particular sex which does 
not receive the aid in a given year, a director could technically 
discourage the development of the women's team.129 While os-
tensibly providing for an equitable distribution of available 
scholarship money based on participation, the inclusion of the 
nondiscriminatory factors weakens the force of Section A. Wo-
men denied adequate scholarships as a result of a programmatic 
decision have little recourse despite the unequal per capita allo-
cation. Although HEW's method of determining compliance pro-
vides flexibility in measuring the distribution of scholarship as-
sistance, it does not guarantee this assistance will be shared 
equitably. Thus the use of nondiscriminatory factors may serve 
to slow the pace of compliance with Title IX. 
to limit grants-in-aid to athletes with proven financial need 
have not been successful. 
. . . Although AIA W regulations also permit "full ride" 
grants-in-aid for female athletes •.• AlA W data show that 
women receive considerably less money for grants-in-aid than 
men. 
MORE HURDLES To CLEAR, supra note 3, at 30 (footnotes omitted). For example, at Syra-
cuse University, 83% of the available scholarship money goes to the 75% male athletic 
population while only 17% goes to the women who comprise 25% of the participating 
athletes. deCrow, Hardlining Title IX: Who's Off-Side Now?, PERsPECTIVES, Summer 
1980, at 18-19. 
127. See Update on Title IX and Sports #2, On Campus With Women, supra note 
113. 
128. Id. Because the distribution of available scholarship money is left to the discre-
tion of the athletic director, the manner in which expenditures are made may determine 
the growth of the team. See text accompanying note 125 supra. 
129. Update on Title IX and Sports #2, On Campus With Women, supra note 113. 
"Thus a director could technically decide to defer some or even all women's' awards in a 
particular year, claiming that 'next year' would be a better time to encourage a particular 
women's sport." Id. at 4. 
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Equivalence of Benefits and Opportunities 
Section B, entitled "Equivalence in Other Athletic Benefits 
and Opportunities,"ISO provides a more expansive list of criteria 
for determining whether an athletic program is nondiscrimina-
tory. Using the equal opportunity provision of the regulation as 
its basis, lSI the Department will compare the "availability, quali-
ty, and kinds of benefits, opportunities and treatment afforded 
members of both sexes"IS2 to assess compliance. HEW lists nine 
nonfinancial factors to be used in evaluating whether men and 
women are receiving equal benefits: 
(1) Provision and maintenance of equipment and supplies; 
(2) Scheduling of games and practice times; 
(3) Travel and per diem expenses; _ 
(4) Opportunity to receive coaching and academic tutoring; 
(5) Assignment and compensation of coaches and tutors; 
(6) Provision of medical and training facilities; 
(7) Provision of locker rooms, practice and competitive 
facilities; 
(8) Provision of housing and dining facilities; and 
(9) Publicity. ISS 
HEW bases its compliance determination on whether each 
of these program components are equivalent, that is, equal or 
equal in effect.1S' Additionally, HEW will examine the recruit-
ment practices of the athletic programs for both sexes to deter-
mine whether the goal of equal opportunity will require modifi-
cation of those practices.1SG Identical recruiting methods are not 
required although nondiscriminatory criteria must be used in 
structuring recruitment programs. ISS The proposed policy listed 
recruitment under the financially measurable benefits section,lS7 
subject to the per capita formulation. By removing it from that 
section, recruitment is no longer assessed by a financial compari-
130. 44 Fed. Reg. 71,415-17 (1979). 
131. See note 74 supra, for text of equal opportunity provision of the final 
reiuIations. 
132. 44 Fed. Reg. 71,415 (1979). 
133. ld. at 71,415-17. 
134. ld. at 71,415. 
135. ld. at 71,417. 
136.ld .. 
137. 43 Fed. Reg. 58,072 (1978). 
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son to determine whether benefits are distributed in a propor-
tionate fashion. The standard now used to measure compliance 
is, more generally, equality of opportunity.13s One author argues 
that this measurement, as applied to recruitment, will not pre-
vent discrimination.139 In fact, "[t]he shift is away from a com-
parison by sexes to, essentially, an inter-institutional comparison 
within each sex group which could permit, not forestall, discrim-
ination. "140 As a result, recruitment practices which require 
more money to attract the best male athletesl4l may go 
unchecked. 
HEW defends its Section B criteria by claiming that identi-
cal opportunities are not required and that disparities may be 
justified by nondiscriminatory factors. In The "unique aspect of 
a particular sport" or "activities which are directly associated 
with a competitive event in a single sex sport"I43 are examples 
of such factors. Features which are considered "directly associ-
ated with a competitive event" include "rules of play, nature/ 
replacement of equipment, rates of injury resulting from partici-
pation, nature of facilities required for competition, and the 
maintenance/upkeep requirements of those facilities."144 This 
provision was promulgated to exempt institutions from having 
to provide equal athletic opportunities in sports traditionally 
played by men. Football, for example, is unique for its high per 
capita cost.1415 This feature virtually exempts football from con-
54. 
138. 44 Fed Reg. at 71,415. 
139. See GaaI, DiLorenzo & Evans, supra note 114, at 357. 
140.Id. 
141. See, e.g., Axhelm, The Shame of College Sports, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 22, 1980, at 
142. 44 Fed. Reg. 71,415-16 (1979). 
143.Id. 
144.Id. 
145. See Spink, Popular, But Expensive, 16 NCAA NEWS, No. 17, at 2 (1980). 
From head to toe, it costs between $250 and $400 to outfit a 
college football player. The bill goes something like this: Hel-
met, $70; shoulder pads, $40; shoes, $40; jersey, $20; pants, 
$40; girdle pads, $15; thigh pads, $15; knee pads, $5; mouth-
piece, $2; socks, $2; sanitary shorts, $3; and supporter, $1. Add 
optional elbow, forearm and hand pads, $20, and shoulder pad 
extensions, $12, and the total of $260. That isn't all. You need 
a couple of jerseys and pants of different colors since the 
teams play home and away games, plus foul-weather capes 
and practice uniforms, and you're up to around $400 a player. 
Id. "The average college with Division I football spends $1,045,000 on that sport, or 47 
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sideration when determining whether equality of opportunity is 
present. Because single sex sports such as football and basket-
ball are conducted on a national level, per capita expenses are 
greater than expenses for sports conducted at a regional or local 
level. A women's team in the initial stages of development, and 
therefore confined to the local level, would not receive the same 
degree of institutional support that the more popular, male-
dominated sports receive. HEW justifies this imbalance by not-
ing the unique demands of these athletic events: "Since the costs 
of managing an athletic event increase with crowd size, the over-
all support made available for event management to men's and 
women's programs may differ in degree and kind."l46 When 
men's athletic events are assumed to be more commercially via-
ble, aner therefore more deserving of funds, efforts to increase 
the spectator appeal of women's athletic events will go unsup-
ported. Because HEW considers the "particular sport" exception 
in determining whether institutions provide equal athletic op-
portunities, Title IX's broad prohibition against discrimination 
is not assured. . 
Effective Accommodation of Student Interests and Abilities 
Section C of the policy interpretation provides guidelines 
for determining compliance with the provision of the regulation 
that requires an athletic director to consider "whether the selec-
tion of sports and levels of competition effectively accommodate 
the interests and abilities of members of both sexes. "14'1 HEW 
assesses compliance by examining the interests and abilities of 
athletes, the selection of sports offered, the levels of competition 
available, and the opportunity for team competition.148 If an in-
stitution sponsors a team for men in a specific sport, it may be 
required to permit women to try out for that team or to sponsor 
a separate team.149 With regard to contact SpOrts,IISO if an institu-
tion sponsors a team for members of one sex, it must also pro-
percent of its men's athletic budget. The average Division I football squad is composed 
of 106 athletes; these colleges therefore spend an average of $9,858 on each football ath-
lete." MORE HURDLES To CLEAR supra note 3, at 29 (footnotes omitted). 
146. 44 Fed: Reg. 71,416 (1979). 
147. ld. at 71,417. 
148.ld. 
149. ld. at 71,418. 
150. See text accompanying note 78 supra, for those sports which HEW considers 
contact sports. 
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vide a team for members of the other sex. This will be required 
only if sufficient interest and ability· to sustain a viable team 
with a reasonable expectation of intercollegiate competition is 
shown.llli If opportunities for one sex have been historically lim-
ited, a separate team may be required.11l2 In non-contact sports, 
HEW additionally requires an institution to sponsor a separate 
team if members of the excluded sex lack sufficient skill to be 
selected for a single integrated team. IllS 
The contact sports exception is the subject of continuing 
debate. 1M Assuming that the women's team in any given sport 
does not have a reasonable expectation of intercollegiate compe-
tition,lllll the exceptional sportswoman may desire a place on the 
men's team so that she may develop her full athletic potential. 
Unfortunately, the final policy does not set forth specific guide-
lines which might guarantee her participation should she qual-
ify. If she is denied an opportunity to compete, the prospect of 
equal opportunity will be limited. Even if the institution spon-
sors a separate women's team, her skill level may never be 
matched by other team players. Additionally, when only a mi-
nority of women are interested in contact sports, under Section 
C, these women will be denied an opportunity to compete. 
The contact sports exception is not justified on the basis of 
statistics concerning risk of injury to women.lIIS Research on the 
151. 44 Fed. Reg. 71,418 (1979). 
152. Id. 
153. Id. 
154. See Cox, supra note 4, at 44-45 (contact sports exception does not further stat-
utory purpose); Hitchens, A Litigation Strategy on Behalf of the Outstanding High 
School Female Athlete, 8 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 423 (1979) (the exceptional female 
athlete denied an opportunity to compete on male teams in contact and non contact 
sports may not develop full athletic potential); Note, Title IX of the Education Amend-
ments of 1972: Issues Reach the Courts, 18 WASHBURN L.J. 310, 323 (1979) ("Disap-
proval of the contact sport regulation is not surprising, for its total denial of opportunity 
to participate in an education activity on the basis of sex is clearly inconsistent with 
Title IX's equal opportunity purpose."). 
155. For example, although there may be substantial interest and ability to sustain 
a women's football team in one institution, this level of interest may not be matched by 
women players at other institutions thus decreasing the opportunity for intercollegiate 
competition. 
156. Cox, supra note 4, at 44, notes that: 
Opposition to mixed competition in contact sports is 
based on an underlying belief that women will have a higher 
rate of injuries than men if men and women compete against 
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physical and athletic differences between men and women indi-
cates that in some ways the female's endurance level may be 
equal to or greater than the male's.11I7 Records demonstrate that 
differences in performance potential between men and women in . 
athletic events· are diminishing,11I8 and sports physiologists have 
shown that women can compete as actively as men in all 
sports.11I9 Despite this data, however, the cultural taboo against 
each other. To justify the contact sports exception in intercol-
legiate athletics because of the increased injury risk to women, 
one must conclude that women are more susceptible to inju-
ries than men at the same levels of ability, a conclusion that is 
far from obvious. Statistics concerning the relative size, 
weight, and likelihood of injury of average women and men are 
irrelevant, for example, to the possible exclusion of all women 
from an intercollegiate football team, because neither average 
women nor average men could normally compete on such 
teams. 
(Footnotes omitted.) 
157. "As more and more women enter long distance events, 8uch as the marathons 
and multievent supermarathons, evidence is growing that their endurance may be equal 
or perhaps even superior to men's in some ways, and their systems may be more efficient 
in turning stored fats into energy." Wood, The Emerging Woman Athlete, Sunday Ex-
aminer & Chronicle, May 25, 1980, at 5, col. 1. Another author finds that women are 
better 8uited for long distance events: 
In general, a woman needs less food than a man of equal 
weight; she has more accessible calories to burn in the same 
activity because of the thicker layer of fat under her skin. This 
fat gives her a larger reserve energy supply for endurance con-
tests, so she is less dependent on carbohydrate loading-filling 
up on 8tarch to build up stores of glycogen fuel in the muscles. 
The insulating fat also makes a woman's slightly lower body 
temperature more stable than a man's. She relies less on 
sweating to dissipate heat; therefore she retains fluid and salts 
better and doesn't need to drink as much during exertion. As a 
result of this difference, a woman tends to perform better in 
cold but has less tolerance of heat than a man of equal size. 
Cimons, How Women Got To Run The Distance, MS., July 1981, at 47. 
158. Wood, supra note 157, at 5. 
159. Sports physiologists have demonstrated that women can play 
as actively as men, that Olympic athletes have competed and 
won at all stages of the menstrual cycle, and that exercise, if 
anything, is beneficial rather than harmful in alleviating men-
strual complaints. The effect of training and competition on 
the ease of childbirth is pronounced. A study of Olympic ath-
letes showed that they delivered their babies 87.2 percent 
faster than established norms, with 50 percent fewer Caesa-
rian sections than in normal populations. Another study found 
that women with chronic fatigue and low back pain following 
pregnancy suffered primarily from the lack of physical activity 
dating from poorly developed anterior abdominal musculature. 
MORE HURDLES To CLEAR, supra note 3, at 5 (footnotes omitted). The stereotype regard-
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women participating in contact sports remains.1SO Women have 
been conditioned throughout their lives to avoid displays of 
strength which, in turn, has inhibited their desire to perform in 
athletic competitions.1s1 Thus, sport, according to the stereo-
ing women's physical fragility while menstruating or while pregnant is based upon myths 
which reinforce female passivity. 
160. Due to the stereotypic view of female behavior, the sportswoman who partici-
pates in contact sports with men or in sports which require overt aggressive behavior 
may suffer anxiety over the conflict between her desire to compete and her desire to 
conform to the accepted role model which society has given her. 
It would seem that this anxiety is the expression of the inner 
conflict between desires to fulfill the expectations outlined by 
society. Homer has identified the female's conflict between 
her competitive desires and her desire to fit into society as a 
double bind. Performance in sport especially intensifies this 
conflict because athletics is one area that has been historically 
appropriate for males only. Thus, for the female athlete, it is 
not only that she has exhibited qualities that do not conform 
to society's 'appropriate sex-role' but that she has actively 
pursued this nonappropriate behavior in what was an exclu-
sively male territory. 
Del Rey, The Apologetic and Women in Sport, in WOMEN AND SPORT, supra note 1, at 
108 (footnote omitted). As one author notes, "To be female and an athlete have been 
contradictory role expectations." Mathes, Body Image and Sex Stereotyping, WOMEN 
AND SPORT, supra note 1, at 66. The existing stereotypic differences tend to reinforce the 
idea that women are passive, emotional, and expressive while men are active, aggressive, 
and effective. In contemporary American culture, this is a deeply received way of think-
ing about the sexes. The differences are not only approved of, but are often idealized. 
The ideal woman is perceived as significantly less aggressive, 
less independent, less dominant, less active, more emotional, 
having greater difficulty in making decisions, etc., than the 
ideal man; the ideal man is perceived as significantly less reli-
gious, less neat, less gentle, less aware of the feelings of others, 
less expressive, etc., than the ideal woman. Both greater com-
petence in men than in women, and greater warmth and ex-
pressiveness in women than in men, then, are apparently de-
sirable in our contemporary society. 
Broverman, Vogel, Broverman, Clarkson, & Rosenkrantz, Sex-Role Stereotypes: A Cur-
rent Appraisal, in WOMEN AND ACHIEVEMENT, supra note 2, at 39. Thus, there are social 
pressures which the female athlete must resist and overcome before her participation in 
contact sports will be regarded as healthy, not only by other athletes, but, it is hoped, by 
society at large. 
161. No doubt exists that men are stronger than women, but the 
actual strength of women, particularly in this country, has 
been underestimated. The potent social stigma that is at-
tached to the attainment of strength by females is a powerful 
influence that certainly must affect the amount of force pro-
duced by females on strength tests .... A compounding factor 
is that many strength tests are administered to females in 
groups, or worse, in the presence of males. Finally, almost all 
experimentors who have measured the strength of females are 
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type, is "not so serious nor central to women. "162 As more media 
attention focuses on women's achievement in sport, this societal 
barrier, often internalized by women, may diminish. Demystifi-
cation of sport must begin in the schools where young girls re-
ceive their first exposure to team competition. If higher educa-
tional institutions continue to exclude the female athelete from 
contact sports because of cultural and economic pressures, not 
only will her athletic potential be limited; her opportunity for a 
future career in professional sports will be stifled. 
IV. REMEDIES 
A. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES 
Despite the weaknesses inherent in the final policy interpre-
tation, sportswomen who suffer discrimination should vigorously 
pursue their rights using both the administrative procedures 
available under Title IX and their private right of action. The 
first step is to notify the institution that the alleged discrimina-
tion violates Title IX.163 For example, if the women's crew team 
males. Adolescent females are loathe to display strength under 
any circumstances, but particularly in the presence of a male. 
In summary, women are certainly not as strong as men, but 
they may not be as weak as they have been credited to be. 
More specifically, the age of 12lh as the age of maximum 
strength may be an artifact of the adolescent society. 
F. GERBER, J. FELSHIN, P. BERLIN & W. WYRICK, supra note 1, at 429. One author notes 
that there is "common agreement that the upper body of the female has about 50 to 60 
percent the strength of the male and the lower body has 70 to 80 percent the strength of 
the male. When a correction is made for si2e, the female has about 80 percent of the 
strength of a male." Hudson, Physical Parameters Used for Female Exclusion from Law 
Enforcement and Athletics, in WOMEN AND SPORT, supra note 1, at 35. Cultural expecta-
tions tend to diminish the chance that an average girl has of developing upper body 
strength as early as the fifth year. Girls and women are conditioned not to show strength. 
Evidence shows that through puberty muscles grow first in si2e and later in strength. 
Because strength depends on appropriate physical exercise, and the adolescent environ-
ment is not conducive to athletic training for girls, this period is perhaps the most im-
portant reason behind the lack of strength in most women. As a result, differences be-
tween men and women appear to be more a function of activity level than gender. ld. at 
40-41. To make a fair comparison of performance potential between the sexes, events 
with equivalence in training, motivation, equipment, and structural composition should 
be exanlined. ld. at 49. 
162. F. GERBER, J. FELSHIN, P. BERLIN, & W. WYRICK, supra note 1, at 206. The 
authors maintain that societal assumptions regarding female athletes create the very 
conditions which denigrate sport as an activity for women. ld. 
163. Telephone interview with Sheryl Sklorman, Project Assistant at SPRINT, a 
project of the Women's Equity Action League Educational and Legal Defense Fund in 
Washington, D.C. (Jan. 5, 1981). 
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has access to the boats at five a.m., while the men's.team always 
uses the boats in the afternoon, the athletic department and the 
administration should be informed of the unequal accommoda-
tion.164 If an institution covered by Title Ix does not voluntarily 
act to correct the discrimination, the athlete may then file a let-
ter of complaint with the Department of Education (Depart-
ment).165 The complaint must be filed within 180 days after the 
discrimination occurs unless the illegal activity is ongoing.166 If 
the athletic program has a history of discrimination still in oper-
ation, the athlete may file her complaint at any time. The com-
plaint should include a detailed description of the alleged viola-
tions.167 The Department must investigate the complaint within 
ninety days of receipt.16B If the Department finds the institution 
164. Systematic procedures on how an athlete might organize an effort to make a 
particular institution aware of discrimination may be obtained by writing to SPRINT, 
Project of the Women's Equity Action League Educational and Legal Defense Fund, 805 
15th St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005. 
165. 45 C.F.R. § 80.7(b) (1974). See NOW LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND, 
PROJECT ON EQUAL EDUCATION RIGHTS, ANYONE'S GUIDE TO FILING A TITLE IX COMPLAINT, 
(1980) [hereinafter cited as GUIDE]. Reprints are available through PEER, 112 13th St., 
N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005. Administrative remedies under Title IX are identical to 
those of Title VI. See note 13 supra and accompanying text, for a discussion of similari-
ties between the statutes. 
166. 45 C.F.R. § 80.7(b) (1980). 
167. See GUIDE, supra note 165, at 1. The letter should also include the name and 
address of the university, a general description of the person(s) suffering from discrimi-
nation, and the approximate date(s) of discrimination. [d. 
168. 44 Fed. Reg. 71,418 (1979). This section provides: 
The process of Title IX enforcement is set forth in Sec-
tion 86.71 of the Title IX regulation, which incorporates by 
reference the enforcement procedures applicable to Title VI of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The enforcement process pre-
scribed by the regulation is supplemented by an order of the 
Federal District Court, District of Columbia, which establishes 
time frames for each of the enforcement steps. 
According to the regulation, there are two ways in which 
enforcement is initiated: 
Compliance Reviews-Periodically the Department must 
select a number of recipients (in this case, colleges and univer-
sities which operate intercollegiate athletic programs) and 
conduct investigations to determine whether recipients are 
complying with Title IX. (45 CFR 80.7(a». 
Complaints-The Department must investigate all valid 
(written and timely) complaints alleging discrimination on the 
basis of sex in a recipient's programs. (45 CFR 80.7(b». 
The Department must inform the recipient (and the com-
plainant, if applicable) of the results of its investigation. If the 
investigation indicates that a recipient is in compliance, the 
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in violation and the school does not voluntarily comply, the De-
partment will begin a formal process leading to termination of 
federal assistance.1G9 
Although these procedures are outlined in detail in the final 
policy interpretation, and the Office for Civil Rights is under 
court order to enforce them,170 implementation has been ineffec-
tive.171 Due to lack of resources and the delay between initial 
Department states this, and the case is closed. If the investiga-
tion indicates noncompliance, the Department outlines the vi-
olations found. 
The Department has 90 days to conduct an investigation 
and inform the recipient of its findings, and an additional 90 
days to resolve violations by obtaining a voluntary compliance 
agreement from the recipient. This is done through negotia-
tions between the Department and the recipient, the goal of 
which is agreement on steps the recipient will take to achieve 
compliance. Sometimes the violation is relatively minor and 
can be corrected immediately. At other times, however, the 
negotiations result in a plan that will correct the violations 
within a specified period of time. To be acceptable, a plan' 
must describe the manner in which institutional resources will 
be used to correct the violation. It also must state acceptable 
time tables for reaching interim goals and full compliance. 
When agreement is reached, the Department notifies the insti-
tution that its plan is acceptable. The Department then is ob-
ligated to review periodically the implementation of the plan. 
An institution that is in violation of Title IX may already 
be implementing a corrective plan. In this case, prior to in-
forming the recipient about the results of its investigation, the 
Department will determine whether the plan is adequate. 
169. 44 Fed. Reg. 71,419 (1979). See note 32 supra, for text of fund termination 
provision. 
170. OCR is responsible for enforcing Title IX. In a consolidation of three cases, the 
District Court for the District of Columbia ordered OCR to conduct investigations of 
colleges and universities under two separate timetables set forth in the consent decree. 
Adams v. Califano, No. 3095-70 (D.D.C. 1977). 
171. Continual criticism has been leveled at HEW's enforcement 
effort. In 1974 the Women's Equity Action League (WEAL), 
joined by other organizations and individuals, filed suit 
against HEW for failure to enforce Executive orders and stat-
utes, including Title IX, that prohibit discrimination on the 
basis of sex in educational institutions and programs receiving 
Federal funds. In 1975 this Commission criticized HEW for its 
long delay in publishing final Title IX regulations, observing 
that the Department's Office for Civil Rights (OCR) had 
thereby "effectively nullified the intent of the Congress." A 
1976 study by the Project on Equal Education Rights (PEER) 
concluded that HEW's enforcement efforts to that date had 
been "negligible", and another study completed that year 
found that HEW had failed to set "clear and consistent poli-
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complaints and investigations, administrative proce4ures may be 
of limited use. An athlete may wait years before investigations 
are completed and compliance finally achieved.1'12 The adminis-
trative procedure is important, however, because the alterna-
tive-filing a lawsuit-may be financially infeasible for many 
student athletes. 
B. PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION: RECENT CASES 
Under Cannon v. University of Chicago,1'18 a private right of 
cies and enforce them to implement Title IX." In 1977 the 
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, in approving 
a settlement of the WEAL suit and two other cases involving 
HEW's civil rights enforcement practices, issued an order set-
ting time frames for processing complaints and eliminating the 
complaint backlog and specifying the number of sex discrimi-
nation complaints to be processed and Title IX compliance re-
views to be conducted the following year. Commonly known as 
the Adams order after another case it settled, the order noted 
in the preamble that if OCR staff were not further increased, 
compliance would require substantially increased efficiency • 
. . . [I)n November 1979 OCR acknowledged that it had 
not complied fully with the Title IX requirements of the Ad-
ams order, having failed to resolve policy in three critical areas 
or devote sufficient staff resources to compliance reviews. 
ENFORCING TrrLE IX, supra note 11, at 3-5 (footnotes omitted). "In its submission to 
[the Supreme) Court, as well as in other public statements, HEW has candidly admitted 
that it does not have the resources necessary to enforce Title IX in a substantial number 
of circumstances ...• " Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 708 n.42 (1979). 
See also Note, The Enforcement Provisions for Title IX of the Education Amendments 
of 1972 Can Be Strengthened to Make the Title IX Regulations More Effective, 49 
TEMP. L.Q. 207, 221 (1975). 
172. Universities Charged With Sex Discrimination in Athletics Under Title IX, 
SPRINT, IN THE RUNNING, No.3, 1980, at 2 (complaints filed in 1973 still pending). 
173. 441 U.S. 677 (1979). Geraldine Cannon applied for admission in 1974 to medi-
cal school at the University of Chicago and Northwestern University. She was denied 
admission allegedly due to her age; both schools had express policies against admitting 
individuals over thirty without advanced degrees. Ms. Cannon was 39 years old at the 
time of her application. After seeking reconsideration from admission officials, she sub-
mitted a complaInt to the Chicago Office of HEW alleging the medical schools had vio-
lated Title IX by denying her admission on the basis of sex. Both schools were recipients 
of federal funds. Mter receiving only an acknowledgment of her complaint from HEW, 
Ms. Cannon filed suit in federal court in the Northern District of Illinois. The court 
dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim for relief. Cannon 
v. University of Chicago, 406 F. Supp. 1257 (N.D. Ill. 1976), aff'd on rehearing, 559 F.2d 
1077 (7th Cir. 1977). The issue on appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court was whether peti-
tioner had a private right of action under Title IX. The Supreme Court reversed, holding 
that such a right was implied in the legislative history of the statute. 441 U.S. at 677-78. 
See Wallace, How to Cure Your Sex Discrimination Ills: Take One Title IX Private 
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action will be implied under Title IX..1'14 Administrative reme-
dies need not be exhausted before filing suit in federal COurt.l'11S 
The court in Cannon based its conclusion, in part, on the fact 
that Title IX. was specifically modeled after Title VI, which had 
been interpreted to provide a private remedy for the victim of 
discrimination.l '16 Additionally, the court recognized the inade-
quacy of the administrative enforcement of the statutel '1'1 when 
it stated that "an implied private right of action is necessary to 
insure the fundamental purpose of Title IX. •••• "1'18 
The most recent cases following the Cannon decision have 
been brought as class actions on behalf of members of university 
athletic teams alleging violations of Title IX..1'19 In Rollin Ha/fer 
v. Temple University/SO a .suit currently pending, eight female 
athletes charged the university with discrimination in areas such 
as scholarships, facilities, equipment, financial support, and re-
cruitment.1Sl A financial breakdown of fund allocation is set 
forth in the complaint as evidence of noncompliance.182 Plain-
tiffs allege that male athletes at Temple University received 
more than $700,000 in scholarships during the 1979-1980 aca-
demic year, compared with $188,000 in scholarships for wo-
men.1SS The University's Faculty Senate report indicated that, 
Action and Cannon v. University of Chicago, Then Sue Them in the Morning, 1980 
UTAH L. REV. 629; Comment, Private Right of Action Under Title IX: Cannon v. Uni-
versity of Chicago, 57 DENVER L.J. 437 (1980); Comment, Private Rights of Action Under 
Title IX, 13 MARv. C.R.L. REv. 425 (1978); Comment, Private Rights of Action Under 
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972: Cannon v. University of Chicago, 3 
HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 141 (1980); Comment, Implication of a Private Right of Action 
Under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, Nw. U.L. REv. 772 (1978). 
174. 441 U.S. 677 (1979). 
175. Ido at 707 n.41. 
176. Id. at 696. 
177. Ido at 708. 
178. Ido at 708 n.42. 
179. Rollin Haffer v. Temple Univ., No. 80-1362 (EoD. Pa., filed April 8, 1980); Ben-
nett v. West Texas State Univ., No. 2-80-73, (N.D. Tex., filed May 22, 1980); Pavey v. 
University of Alaska, 490 F. Supp. 1011 (D. Alaska 1980). The complaint in Pavey 
charged the university with discrimination against female students in its athletic pro-
gram in violation of Title IX and the due process and equal protection clauses of the 
fourteenth amendment. 
180. No. 80-1362 (E. D. Pa., filed April 8, 1980) (Complaint on file at the Golden 
Gate University Law Review Office). 0 
181. Complaint at 1, Rollin Haffer v. Temple Univ., No. 80-1362. See On Campus 
With Women, Fall 1980, supra note 113, for a report on the facts of the case. 
182. Complaint at 12, 15, 29, Rollin Haffer v. Temple Univ., No. 80-1362. 
183. Complaint at 12. 
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even excluding money allocated to the school's foot"Qall program, 
the budget for men's sports exceeded the women's intercollegi-
ate athletic budget by 3.6 to 1, although the ratio of males to 
females participating in intercollegiate athletics at Temple was 
much closer.ls4 This type of specific data is necessary to support 
allegations based on sections A and B of the final policy 
interpretation. 
In another pending case, Bennett v. West Texas State Uni-
versity/s5 female athletes have brought a class action suit under 
Title IX alleging discriminatory practices in areas of scholarship, 
travel allowances, compensation and treatment of coaches, pro-
vision of locker room, practice, and office facilities, and provision 
of publicity, promotion, and awards. ISS Once again, the content 
of the allegations is based on sections A and B of the final policy 
interpretation. Although these two cases provide examples of in-
itiallitigation strategy, their effectiveness in court is unknown. 
It is important that sportswomen who want to participate in 
contact sports also seek relief through the courts. The contact 
sports exception has been considered unconstitutional as applied 
to interscholastic sports in two recent federal court decisions.187 
184. ld. at 31. 
185. No. 2-80-73, (N.D. Tex. filed May 22, 1980) (Complaint on file at the Golden 
Gate University Law Review Office). 
186. Complaint at 56. 
187. See Leffel v. Wisconsin Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 444 F. Supp. 1117 (E.D. 
Wis. 1978); Yellow Springs Bd. of Educ. v. Ohio School Athletic Ass'n, 443 F. Supp. 753 
(S.D. Ohio 1978), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 647 F.2d 651 (1981). In Leffel, 
plaintiffs were a class composed of all female public high school students in Wisconsin 
who wished to participate on public high school varsity athletic teams. They sought a 
declaration that a provision of the Wisconsin Interscholastic Athletic Association-which 
limited coeducational interscholastic activity-violated the equal protection clause of the 
fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. They also sought a permanent 
injunction enjoining enforcement of the provision. In defense, the athletic association 
claimed the provision conformed to the contact sports exception. The court recognized 
the contact sports exception but rejected this defense. "The enactment of Title IX did 
not remove the problem of sex discrimination from constitutional concern; congressional 
enactments cannot preempt provisions of the Constitution." ld. at 1120. 
In Yellow Springs, the district court held the contact sports exception deprived 
"physically qualified girls of liberty without due process of law." 443 F.2d at 759. The 
court noted the stereotype on which many presumptions are based. "It has always been 
traditional that 'boys play football and girls are cheerleaders.' Why so? Where is it writ-
ten that girls may not, if suitably qualified, play football?" ld. On appeal, the Sixth 
Circuit remanded the case for retrial, and issued an injunction temporarily forbidding 
the school board from enforcing the athletic association's rule. 647 F.2d at 658. The court 
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Exceptional female athletes are urged to follow in the wake of 
these precedents. Only through consistent court action will Title 
IX become an important tool for ending discrimination against 
women. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, it is in the best interests of society to encourage 
women to develop their athletic potential, to "appreciate their 
physical abilities, and enjoy the mastery of their bodies in sport-
ing activity.m88 One autl;lOr urges an equalitarian approach and 
suggests that, "[i]f participation in sport is going to mold lead-
ers, build stamina, heighten competitive spirit, produce physical 
fitness, create mental toughness and put students through col-
lege, then girls, as well as boys should have equal opportunity to 
participate in sport and gain such benefits."189 If women are pre-
vented from participating in those sports which traditionally 
draw the largest crowds, have the most capital at their disposal, 
and receive the greatest support from the university, they will 
not achieve equality.190 They will continue to be discriminated 
against in those programs which have the greatest resources for 
developing athletic skills. 
Had the final policy interpretation incorporated the sugges-
tions of those who urged that specific measures be taken in im-
plementing Title IX,191 equal opportunity may have been as-
did not consider whether HEW's regulation itself was unconstitutional. The dissent, 
however, did regard separate teams for girls and boys as a violation of the equal protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment. [d. at 666 (Jones, J., dissenting). 
188. See Duquin, The Androgynous Advantage, in WOMEN AND SPORT, supra note I, 
at 97. 
189. [d. 
190. See Rose, The ERA and Women's Sport: An Hypothetical Trial Case, in WO-
MAN AND SPORT, supra note I, at 237, in which the author suggests that the separate but 
equal model does not achieve true equality due to perpetuation of social barriers. The 
existence of separate teams may merely reinforce this cycle. 
191. With regard to the proposed policy interpretation, it was stated: 
The Title IX regulation specifically authorized a three year 
adjustment period (which ended on July I, 1978) for post-
secondary institutions to bring their athletic programs into 
compliance. This effort should have included attempts to in-
crease participation rates and to improve levels of competition 
for women, but the new policy ignores this. Instead it requires 
only that inequities affecting present athletes be eliminated 
immediately, and that institutions have a policy which permits 
expansion of participation and competitive opportunities for 
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sured. The statute would have received its intended expression 
more readily if the policy specified the rate at which improve-
ments should be made with regard to participation and levels of 
competition.192 It should have called for comparable participa-
tion rates and levels of competition as targets to be achieved 
within a fixed time frame.19s In addition, the policy should have 
clearly stated that institutions are responsible for annually as-
sessing newly developing interests and abilities in order to fulfill 
their Title IX obligations.194 By disregarding these proposed 
procedures, HEW weakened the statute's general prohibition 
against sex discrimination in education. " 
Women must be encouraged to participate in those sports 
which, for so many years, have been closed to them. Only then 
will the stereotype of the woman as passive spectator begin to 
disappear and a new role model, based on athletic achievement, 
be emulated. The final policy interpretation, while it does set 
forth criteria for determining compliance with Title IX, fails to 
strictly regulate those areas where discrimination continues to 
exist. The absence of affirmative requirements, combined with 
the many loopholes and exceptions, undermines the important 
public policy goals which formed the basis of the statute. 
Whether or not sportswomen will truly achieve equality in inter-
collegiate athletics depends both upon their own initiative in 
pursuing their rights and the future dispositions of the courts. 
Whatever the outcome may be, the female athlete is only begin-
ning to express her spirited involvement in American sport. 
women to move forward at an undefined pace. Theoretically 
an institution can perpetually continue to plan to increase op-
portunities for women, and accomplish this at a very slow rate, 
and still be in compliance; i.e., an institution can take 20 or 30 
years to encourage women and increase their participation in 
sports so long that it showed that some progress was being 
made. 
Update on Title IX and Sports #2, On Campus With Women, supra note 113, at 4; See 
YALE NOTE, supra note 4, at 1273-78, which sets forth specific suggestions for alternative 
regulations. 
192. Update on Title IX and Sports #2, On Campus With Women, supra note 113. 
193.Id. 
194.Id. 
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